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ABSTRACT   We use two approaches to examine the macroeconomic conse­
quences for the United States of disruptions in global food commodity markets. 
First, we embed a novel quarterly composite global production index for the 
four basic staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans—in a standard vector auto­
regression model, and we estimate the dynamic effects of global food commod­
ity supply shocks on the U.S. economy. As an alternative, we also estimate the 
consequences of 13 narratively identified global food commodity price shocks. 
Both approaches lead to similar conclusions. Specifically, an unfavorable food 
commodity market shock raises food commodity prices, and leads to a rise in 
food, energy, and core inflation, and also to a persistent decline in real GDP and 
consumer expenditures. A closer inspection of the pass­through reveals that 
households do not only reduce food consumption. In fact, there is a much greater 
decline in durable consumption and investment. Overall, the macroeconomic 
effects turn out to be a multiple of the maximum impact implied by the share 
of food commodities in the consumer price index and household consumption.
It is almost a truism to say that the characters of the seasons exert a very great 
influence on the amount and quality of our home­produce of wheat from year to 
year; and that upon the amount of food which the crop supplies depends very 
materially, though less than formerly, the general prosperity of the nation.
—John Bennet Lawes and Joseph Henry Gilbert (1868, p. 359)
Until the beginning of the 20th century, agricultural fluctuations were considered very important for the business cycles of advanced econ­
omies (Giffen 1879), but the attention given to these fluctuations vanished 
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as agricultural sectors in developed countries contracted. However, the 
huge swings in food commodity prices since the start of the millennium, 
depicted in figure 1, have reignited interest in the linkages between food 
commodity markets and the macroeconomy. In particular, the surge of 
real global food commodity prices by 67 percent between 2002 and 2011, 
a period that has been described as a “global food crisis,” and their sub­
sequent decline by 40 percent, have attracted a vast interest in under­
standing the economic causes and consequences of developments in food 
commodity markets.1
1. Two examples of newspaper articles addressing this topic are “The World Food Crisis” 
(New York Times, April 10, 2008) and “Global Food Crisis Forecast as Prices Reach Record 
Highs” (The Guardian, October 25, 2010). In 2012, the National Bureau of Economic Research 
directed a panel of academic experts to study the economics of food price volatility (Chavas, 
Hummels, and Wright 2014). See also a number of reports from policy institutions on the 
sources and potential consequences of the surge in food prices (Headey and Fan 2010; Abbott, 
Hurt, and Tyner 2011; Trostle and others 2011) or recent micro economic studies that exam­
ine the welfare implications of food price shocks for households in developing economies 
(Ivanic and Martin 2008; Baquedano and Liefert 2014; Dawe and Maltsoglou 2014).
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Source: International Monetary Fund.  
a. Variables are measured as 100 times the natural log of the index deflated by the U.S. consumer price index.  
b. Real food commodity price is a trade-weighted average of benchmark food prices in U.S. dollars for cereals, 
vegetable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges.  
c. Real cereal price is an aggregate of the price of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans on a trend production-
weighted basis.  
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Figure 1. Evolution of Food Commodity Prices over Time, 1960–2015
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However, surprisingly little is known about the repercussions of dis­
ruptions in global food commodity markets for the business cycles of 
the United States and other advanced countries. This lack of quantitative 
evidence for the macroeconomic effects might be justified by the rela­
tively low and declining share of agriculture in real GDP, and the fact 
that the United States is a modest net exporter of cereals, two features that 
are documented in figure 2; but these explanations appear to be mislead­
ing. The share of agriculture in real GDP has, on average, indeed been 
slightly below 2 percent since the 1960s, but this ignores the fact that food 
commodities are a critical input factor in the production function of the 
food­processing sector, while food and beverages have accounted for 
approximately 17 percent of U.S. household spending between the 1960s 
and today.2 Accordingly, food commodity market fluctuations could also 
have important indirect effects on the U.S. economy; that is, food com­
modity market shocks could affect the economy through their impact on 
consumer spending. Examples include the costs of reallocating labor and 
capital across alternative production activities, precautionary savings, or 
a monetary policy response amplifying output effects. Such effects have 
been put forward in the literature on oil and energy price shocks (Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Watson 1997; Hamilton 2008), but could also apply to food 
commodity price shocks. Moreover, there has been a substantial rise in the 
use of food commodities to produce energy goods in recent periods. For 
example, the share of biofuels in petroleum consumption is currently more 
than 5 percent (see figure 2). Fluctuations in food commodity markets may 
therefore also affect the economy via energy prices.
Quantitative evidence for the macroeconomic consequences is not only 
important for gaining a better understanding of business cycle fluctua­
tions. It is also vital for examining the optimal monetary policy response 
2. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, the average share of food and 
beverages in total household expenditures was 17.3 percent between 1960 and 2015. The 
share of food commodities in final food products and beverages expenditures, in turn, 
was 14.1 percent, according to the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research 
Service data, which are only available for the period 1993–2014. This corresponds to $928 
in food commodity expenditures per capita per year (measured in constant 2015 dollar 
values). Overall, only housing and utilities absorb a greater share (17.8 percent) of house­
hold expenditures. The share of oil products (heating oil and motor fuel), for example, 
was on average only 3.8 percent over the same period, while numerous studies have ana­
lyzed the macro economic effects of shocks in the global crude oil market (Hamilton 1983; 
Kilian 2009; Peersman and Van Robays 2009). Notice that about half of gasoline prices 
are determined by the cost of crude oil. Combined with an average share of oil products in 
household expenditures of 3.8 percent, this implies that crude oil expenditures are roughly 
$764 per capita per year.
186 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016
Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis; U.S. Energy Information Administration; UN Comtrade Database 
(1-digit SITC).
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Figure 2. Food and the U.S. Economy, 1960–2015
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to changes in food prices or in assessing the usefulness of public food 
security programs, such as the Federal Agricultural Improvement and 
Reform (FAIR) Act and the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program 
(SNAP, formerly known as the Food Stamp Program). Furthermore, it is 
necessary to analyze the repercussions of several policy measures that may 
influence the price of food, such as trade policies (for example, export bans 
or restrictions on food imports) or policies to reduce carbon dioxide emis­
sions (for example, ethanol subsidies or carbon offset programs). Finally, 
empirical evidence for the macroeconomic effects of food market dis­
ruptions should help to assess the consequences of climate change, which 
could increase the likelihood of significant weather shocks in agriculture.
In this paper, we estimate the effects of disturbances in global food com­
modity markets on the U.S. economy during the period 1963:Q1–2013:Q4. 
An empirical analysis of the macroeconomic effects of fluctuations in food 
commodity markets is challenging because food prices likely respond sub­
stantially to both supply and demand conditions, implying that there are also 
reverse causality effects from macroeconomic aggregates on food prices. 
For instance, the unconditional correlation between changes in real global 
food commodity prices and U.S. real GDP is positive. If one is interested 
in a unique causal interpretation, it is thus crucial to isolate movements in 
food prices that are strictly exogenous. We explore two strategies for iden­
tifying such movements.
The first strategy is a joint structural vector autoregression (VAR) model 
for the global food commodity market and the U.S. economy. To identify 
food market disturbances that are unrelated to macroeconomic conditions, 
we construct a novel quarterly composite global production index for the 
four most important staples: corn, wheat, rice and soybeans. Together, 
these commodities make up approximately 75 percent of the caloric con­
tent of food production worldwide. Annual production data for these 
four crops are available from the Food and Agriculture Organization of 
the United Nations (FAO) for 192 countries starting in the early 1960s. 
Michael Roberts and Wolfram Schlenker (2013) aggregate the four crops 
on a calorie­weighted basis to construct an annual indicator of world food 
production. We use the same principium to construct a quarterly indicator, 
which is an appropriate frequency for a business cycle analysis. Specifi­
cally, we combine the annual production data for each individual country 
with that country’s planting and harvesting calendars for the four crops. 
Because most countries have only one relatively short harvest season for 
each crop, and there is a delay between planting and harvesting, we can 
assign two­thirds of world food production (or harvests) to a quarterly 
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production index that fulfills the condition that the decision to produce 
(that is, to plant) did occur in an earlier quarter. Accordingly, in a quarterly 
VAR, innovations to the food production index (essentially unanticipated 
harvest shocks) are by construction exogenous to the macroeconomy, and 
the subsequent changes in real GDP, consumer prices, and other macro­
economic variables can be given a causal interpretation.
The estimation results assert that global food market disruptions have 
a considerable influence on the U.S. economy. An unfavorable shock to 
the global food production index of 1 standard deviation raises real food 
commodity prices by approximately 1.7 percent, which in turn leads to a 
0.16 percent rise in consumer prices and a persistent decline in real GDP 
and personal consumption of almost 0.3 percent. According to a simple 
back­of­the­envelope calculation, the effects on consumer prices and per­
sonal consumption are approximately four to six times larger than the max­
imum impact implied by the share of food commodities in the consumer 
price index (CPI) and total consumption expenditures (that is, maximum 
discretionary loss in purchasing power). This denotes that indirect effects 
prevail and magnify the macroeconomic consequences. As a reference 
point, the effects on real GDP are roughly twice as large as the impact of 
a similar rise in global crude oil prices induced by an oil supply shock 
identified within the same VAR model. Additionally, Paul Edelstein and 
Lutz Kilian (2009) find that the response of personal consumption to an 
energy price shock is approximately four times the magnitude of the maxi­
mum discretionary purchasing power loss.
The stylized facts obtained from the VAR turn out to be robust for a 
battery of sensitivity tests and perturbations to the benchmark model. We 
also verify whether the innovations to the global production index are 
picking up other shocks, such as oil price or aggregate demand shocks; 
whether the underlying disturbances have effects on the economy other 
than via fluctuations in food commodity markets (for example, through 
direct effects of weather conditions on economic activity); and whether 
the results are distorted by possible time variation or nonlinearities. Over­
all, we do not find support for these conjectures or that such effects have a 
meaningful influence on the results.
As an alternative strategy to address the identification problem, we use 
a narrative approach in the spirit of James Hamilton (1983), Christina and 
David Romer (1989, 2010), Valerie Ramey and Matthew Shapiro (1998), 
and Ramey (2011). The advantage of narrative methods compared with 
the VAR analysis is that it requires fewer assumptions, and we can use 
a very large information set to identify exogenous food market shocks. 
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More precisely, based on FAO reports, newspaper articles, and several 
other sources, we identify 13 historical episodes in which major changes in 
food commodity prices were mainly driven by exogenous disturbances that 
had little to do with macroeconomic conditions. Examples of unambigu­
ously unfavorable food commodity market shocks are the Russian Wheat 
Deal (combined with a failed monsoon in southeast Asia) in the summer 
of 1972, and the more recent Russian and Ukrainian droughts of 2010 and 
2012. In contrast, a number of unanticipated significant upward revisions 
in the expected harvest volume can be classified as episodes of favorable 
food market shocks (for example, in 1975, 1996, and 2004). As the next 
step, we construct a dummy variable based on these episodes, which is then 
used as an instrument to estimate the consequences of global food com­
modity price shocks for the U.S. economy.
The dynamic effects of the narratively identified shocks are estimated 
using Òscar Jordà’s (2005) local projection method. The results confirm the 
conclusions of the VAR analysis. Whereas the narratively identified shocks 
have a more persistent impact on global food commodity prices and macro­
economic variables, the magnitudes of the effects on economic activity are 
very similar to those of the VAR results. The effects on consumer prices 
are even greater. Overall, the macroeconomic consequences of food market 
disturbances turn out to be substantial.
In our next step, we use the VAR model to examine the pass­through 
to consumer prices and economic activity in more detail. To do this, we 
extend the VAR and estimate the effects of food commodity supply shocks 
on inflation components, household expenditure categories, and other rele­
vant variables, while we also compare the dynamics with oil supply shocks. 
The results reveal that not only do food prices increase after an unfavor­
able food commodity supply shock, but so too does core inflation, as well 
as inflation expectations—and, in recent periods, even energy prices. Oil 
supply shocks, in contrast, only raise energy prices. The significant effects 
on core inflation and inflation expectations are presumably the reason why 
we also observe a monetary policy tightening by the Federal Reserve in 
response to food market disruptions, in contrast to a policy easing follow­
ing unfavorable oil supply shocks. A closer inspection of the impact on the 
components of output further reveal that households do not only reduce 
food consumption expenditures. A key mechanism whereby food market 
shocks affect the economy is through a decline in spending on other goods 
and services, in particular durable consumption and investment.
The monetary policy response can be considered as a first amplifica­
tion mechanism for the strong impact of food commodity supply shocks on 
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economic activity. We argue that this can explain at most one­third of the 
overall output consequences, and that the magnitudes and propagation of 
the remaining (nonmonetary policy) output effects are comparable to those 
of oil supply shocks. More specifically, though food supply shocks have a 
significant impact on food consumption, and oil supply shocks have a sig­
nificant impact on energy consumption (and not the other way around), the 
pass­through of both shocks to all other components of household expen­
ditures and investment appear to be quantitatively and qualitatively very 
much alike. This is even the case for the consumption of motor vehicles 
and parts, a component of expenditures that is typically considered to be 
complementary in use with oil, and thus is perceived as much more sensi­
tive to oil shocks. Our results suggest that other effects are more important 
for the propagation of both shocks. We discuss a number of alternative 
channels that could potentially explain the amplification and composi­
tion of the output effects, but the relevance of these mechanisms is hard 
to identify definitively with the methods used in this paper and is left for 
future research.
In sum, the macroeconomic effects of food market disturbances are 
compelling, and should be taken into account for business cycle analysis, 
countercyclical policies, public risk management schemes for the stabili­
zation of food markets, and the assessment of climate change and policy 
measures that may influence food prices.
In section I, we describe the baseline VAR model, the construction of 
the global food production index, and the other variables that are used 
for the estimations. In section II, we discuss the VAR results and several 
sensitivity checks. The narrative approach is discussed in section III. The 
comparison with oil supply shocks and the pass­through to inflation and 
economic activity are analyzed in section IV. Section V concludes.
I.  A VAR Model for the Global Food Market  
and the U.S. Economy
In this section, we discuss our benchmark VAR model. We propose a strat­
egy to identify exogenous food market disturbances within the VAR model, 
and explain the construction of the quarterly global composite food produc­
tion index. We discuss other variables used in the model in subsection I.D.
I.A. Methodology
To estimate the macroeconomic consequences of disruptions in global 
food commodity markets, it is crucial to identify unanticipated shocks in 
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these markets that are exogenous with respect to the macroeconomy. Our 
first strategy is a structural VAR approach in the spirit of Christopher Sims 
(1980), which has been a popular tool in the literature for estimating the 
effects of shocks related to monetary policy (Bernanke and Mihov 1998), 
fiscal policy (Blanchard and Perotti 2002), the oil market (Kilian 2009), 
technology (Galí 1999), and news (Beaudry and Portier 2006). This method 
allows us to capture the dynamic relationships between macroeconomic 
variables within a linear model, isolate structural innovations in the vari­
ables that are independent of each other, and measure the dynamic effects 
of these innovations on all the variables in the VAR system.
The VAR model that we use has the following reduced form repre­ 
sentation:
1 ,1Z A L Z ut t t( )( ) = α + +-
where Zt is a vector of endogenous variables representing the global food 
commodity market and the U.S. economy, α is a vector of constants and 
seasonal dummies, A(L) is a polynomial in the lag operator L, and ut is a 
vector of reduced form residuals. The frequency t of the data is quarterly 
because, as we discuss below, this is essential for the identification of exog­
enous food commodity market shocks.
Because food commodity prices are determined in global markets, Zt 
contains six key variables characterizing these markets: global food com­
modity production, real food commodity prices, global economic activity, 
the real price of crude oil, global crude oil production, and the volume of 
seeds set aside for planting. It is evident that global food production and 
prices portray fluctuations in food markets. Global economic activity mea­
sures changes in global income and the business cycle that could affect the 
demand for food commodities.3 Global oil production and the real price 
of crude oil capture a possible link between oil prices and food commodity 
prices because biofuels can be considered a substitute for crude oil to pro­
duce refined energy products.4 For example, corn is used for producing 
ethanol, and soybeans for producing biodiesel. Alternatively, food com­
modity prices may be affected by oil prices because oil is used in the 
production, processing, and distribution of food commodities. The VAR 
3. This is also typically done in VAR models analyzing the crude oil market (Peersman 
and Van Robays 2009; Kilian 2009; Baumeister and Peersman 2013a).
4. We include both oil market variables because this allows us to also identify oil supply 
shocks in section IV.
192 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016
also includes the volume of harvested seeds that are set aside for plant­
ing, which should be an important determinant of future food production. 
Finally, the VAR contains a set of conventional variables representing the 
U.S. macroeconomy: real GDP, real personal consumption, the CPI, and 
the federal funds rate.
I.B. Identifying Exogenous Food Market Disturbances
U.S. and global macroeconomic variables typically have an influence 
on food commodity markets, implying that there is reverse causality from 
macroeconomic aggregates to food market variables.5 For example, a surge 
in global or U.S. economic activity very likely leads to higher food com­
modity prices relatively quickly. This problem is ignored in existing studies 
from policy institutions (for example, the Federal Reserve, the European 
Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) analyzing the pass­
through of changes in food commodity prices to consumer prices.6 These 
studies typically impose a pricing chain assumption; that is, innovations 
in food commodity prices are not contemporaneously affected by shifts in 
consumer prices. The motivation is that commodity prices are determined 
in flexible markets, whereas consumer prices respond to shocks with a 
delay due to the presence of frictions in final goods markets. However, it 
is possible (and likely) that innovations to real GDP will also have an 
immediate impact on food commodity prices, and a delayed effect on con­
sumer prices. Similarly, oil shocks could simultaneously affect food com­
modity prices (on impact) and consumer prices (with a delay). At best, 
such estimates or correlations can be informative about the signaling role 
of food commodity prices for future inflation; but they cannot be given a 
causal interpretation. The same endogeneity problem applies to the analy­
sis of the output effects of fluctuations in food prices.
To investigate the causal macroeconomic effects of disruptions in global 
food markets, it is hence crucial to isolate a series of exogenous shocks that 
are specific to global food commodity markets. In this subsection, we iden­
tify unanticipated supply shocks to global food production. To achieve 
identification, we explore the time lag between the decision to produce 
5. In essence, the reduced form residuals in equation 1 can be thought of as linear com­
binations of, on one hand, the contemporaneous (within the quarter) endogenous response 
of a variable to innovations in the other variables, and on the other hand, exogenous struc­
tural shocks.
6. See, for example, Furlong and Ingenito (1996); Ferrucci, Jiménez­Rodríguez, and 
Onorante (2012); Pedersen (2011); and Furceri and others (2015). For a similar approach, 
see Rigobon (2010).
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(planting) and the actual production (harvest), and the fact that actual 
production is subject to random shocks, which are caused, for example, 
by changes in weather conditions. More specifically, though farmers can 
respond contemporaneously (within the quarter) to macroeconomic devel­
opments by increasing or decreasing the volume of planting, this is not the 
case for actual production because of the time lag between both activities. 
In subsection I.C, we derive a quarterly global food commodity production 
index that explicitly fulfills this criterion. Hence, innovations to this index 
are exogenous food market disruptions (essentially unanticipated harvest 
shocks) that are uncorrelated with other structural shocks. This is identical 
to a Cholesky decomposition of the variance–covariance matrix ut u′t of 
the VAR, in which the food production index is ordered before the other 
variables.7
I.C. Quarterly Composite Global Food Production Index
Measuring world food commodity production is not straightforward. 
Many distinct commodities matter for food consumption and can be con­
sidered as close substitutes for each other. To simplify the analysis, we 
follow Roberts and Schlenker (2013) by transforming the quantities of 
the four most important staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans—into 
calorie equivalents, which are then aggregated into a single composite 
index. Together, these four commodities account for approximately 75 per­
cent of the caloric content of global food production, whereas the prices 
and quantities of other staple food items are also typically linked to these 
four commodities (Roberts and Schlenker 2013).8
Annual production data for each of the four commodities are pub­
lished by the FAO Statistics Division for 192 countries over the period 
1961–2013.9 Roberts and Schlenker (2013) convert the production data, 
which are measured in tons, into edible calories using the conversion fac­
tors developed by Lucille and Paul Williamson (1942). The calories are 
then aggregated across countries and crops. However, annual production 
data are not suitable for our analysis. In particular, the time lag between 
planting and the actual production of a crop typically varies between 3 and 
7. Notice that the ordering of the other variables does not matter for the identification and 
the estimation of the dynamic effects of food commodity market shocks.
8. Corn and soybeans have respectively the greatest and smallest shares of the four major 
staples. Wheat and rice are between the other two, and have approximately equal shares. 
Roberts and Schlenker (2013) use the composite index of the four staples to estimate annual 
global supply and demand elasticities of agricultural commodities.
9. This database is available at http://faostat3.fao.org/.
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10 months, which implies that production could endogenously respond 
to macroeconomic developments when annual data are used. We therefore 
extend the Roberts and Schlenker (2013) approach to a quarterly frequency 
by combining the annual production data with the crop calendars of each 
individual country. This is feasible because the bulk of the countries have 
only one harvesting season for each crop, which lasts for only a few months.
The harvesting and planting dates of the crop calendars are obtained 
from various sources: the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS) 
crop calendars for the largest producers and exporters; the Global Infor-
mation and Early Warning System (GIEWS) country briefs; and FAO crop 
calendars.10 These calendars have a monthly frequency. For some very 
small producers, for which no crop calendar was found, the harvesting and 
planting dates of the nearest relevant country are used. The final crop cal-
endar, including country- and crop-specific sources and assumptions, can 
be found in the online appendix to this paper.11 If a single harvesting season is 
spread over two subsequent quarters, we allocate the production volume 
to the first quarter. We only consider harvests for which there is no over-
lap with the planting season at a quarterly frequency. Figure 3 shows some 
examples to illustrate how we have assigned the annual food production 
data to a specific quarter based on the crop calendars (planting and harvest-
ing seasons) of the countries:
—For several crops and countries, the allocation to a specific quarter is 
very obvious. The examples given in figure 3 are for Kazakhstan (wheat), 
Russia (rice), South Africa (corn), and Argentina (soybeans). The harvesting 
seasons clearly occur within a single quarter, whereas the planting seasons 
are one or more quarters beforehand.
—Whenever a single harvesting season is spread over two subsequent 
quarters, we allocate the production volume to the first quarter. The exam-
ples given in figure 3 are Mexico (wheat), China (corn), the United States 
(rice), and Brazil (soybeans).
—Some countries have two planting seasons for some crops, such as 
winter and spring wheat in Russia and Canada. However, because their 
harvesting seasons still occur within a single quarter and the planting seasons 
10. The AMIS crop calendars are available at http://www.amis-outlook.org/amis-about/
calendars/en/; the GIEWS country briefs are available at http://www.fao.org/giews/country 
brief/index.jsp; and the FAO crop calendars are available at http://www.fao.org/agriculture/
seed/cropcalendar/welcome.do.
11. The online appendixes for this and all other papers in this volume may be found at 
the Brookings Papers web page, www.brookings.edu/bpea, under “Past BPEA Editions.”
JASMIEN DE WINNE and GERT PEERSMAN 195
are in an earlier quarter, it is possible to allocate the production to a spe-
cific quarter.
—Whenever part of the planting and harvesting seasons overlap at the 
quarterly frequency—for example, for wheat in Brazil—we do not allo-
cate the production. This production is not included in the index.
—For some countries, it is not possible to assign the annual production 
data to a specific quarter because there is more than one harvesting period, or 
because the crops are harvested almost uniformly throughout the year. 
Examples given in figure 3 are Thailand (soybeans) and India (rice). This 
production is not included in the index.
Accordingly, we have managed to assign approximately two-thirds of 
annual world food production to a specific quarter.12 Because of the time 
lag between planting and harvesting of at least one quarter, innovations to 
food production are thus by construction predetermined or exogenous rela-
tive to the other variables included in the VAR. After aggregating the quar-
terly production data across crops and countries, the quarterly global food 
production index is seasonally adjusted using the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
X-13ARIMA-SEATS seasonal adjustment program.13
A couple of points about the index in the context of the VAR analysis are 
worth mentioning. First, although this index does not capture all distur-
bances to global food production, the production volume covered by the 
index should be sufficiently meaningful to influence global food commod-
ity markets, including food commodity prices, which is a prerequisite for 
examining the impact of exogenous food supply shocks on the U.S. macro-
economy. Second, the identified shocks only capture unanticipated changes 
in food production in the harvesting quarter. More specifically, antici-
pated changes in food production before the start of the harvesting season (for 
example, bad weather between planting and harvesting) should already be 
reflected in the other variables and innovations in the VAR, particularly 
food commodity prices.14 Third, our approach assumes that the information 
12. For the individual crops, the index covers 84 percent of global corn production, 
16 percent of rice production, 96 percent of soybean production, and 82 percent of wheat 
production. The coverage of rice production is quite low due to the existence of more than 
one harvesting season in several important producing countries.
13. Information about the program can be found at https://www.census.gov/srd/www/
x13as/.
14. An arbitrage condition ensures that changes in futures prices also shift spot prices of 
storable commodities (Pindyck 1993). If there is a rise in expected food commodity prices—
that is, futures prices increase—traders will buy inventories in the spot market. Hence, spot 
commodity prices also increase.
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sets of local farmers are no greater than the global VAR model. Since 
we do not consider food production forecasts by country, the shocks are 
hence not necessarily identified using the full information sets available to 
the farmers when planting. Finally, our identification strategy also assumes 
that food producers cannot influence the production volume within the 
harvesting quarter. For example, a rise in economic activity or food com-
modity prices could endogenously induce farmers to increase food pro-
duction by increasing fertilization activity. Several studies, however, have 
shown that in-season fertilization is not an efficient way to increase grain 
yields and is not recommended for the food commodities that we consider 
(Mallarino 2010; Schmitt and others 2001; Fanning 2012; Scharf, Wiebold, 
and Lory 2002). Specifically, the best times to apply fertilizer to these 
crops is before or shortly after planting, while fertilization should be com-
pleted before the jointing stage. In fact, fertilizing strategies in the last 
months before the harvest may even be counterproductive and lead to irre-
versible yield loss.15 Whereas some endogenous response might be present, 
this should be meager relative to the variation induced by other factors, for 
example, weather.16
Figure 4 shows the time series of the global food commodity production 
index. There has been an upward trend in food production since the 1960s. 
However, there has also been considerable variation around this trend, 
with spikes of up to 10 percent, suggesting that there have been serious 
food production disruptions. The figure also shows an index of global 
food production excluding U.S. production, and an index of global produc-
tion yields. Both indicators are used below in a sensitivity analysis of the 
benchmark results (subsection II.D). The production yield is defined as the 
ratio of food production to the area harvested, which is also obtained from 
the FAO database (see footnote 9). The upward trend in this variable is flat-
ter than the production volume, implying that part of the food production 
15. The bottom line is that fertilization strategies (for example, nitrogen and phosphate 
applications) enhance plant cell multiplication and stimulate vegetative growth of the 
plant in order to grow as much as possible before the onset of the ripening phase. How-
ever, applying such strategies after the vegetative stage implies that the plant can spend 
less energy on ripening, which could result in lower grain yields. In principle, farmers 
could always reduce food production, for example, by destroying crops or an insufficient 
treatment of diseases during the harvesting season, but that is not likely to happen at a large 
scale.
16. Notice also that the production volume of the four staples that is not covered by our 
index cannot endogenously respond to macroeconomic conditions within the quarter due to 
a standard time lag between planting and harvesting of at least three months.
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expansion is driven by an increase in the amount of land that is used in 
crop production.
I.D. Other Variables
For the baseline estimations, we use the broad food commodity price 
index from the International Monetary Fund. The index is a trade­weighted 
average of different benchmark food prices in U.S. dollars for cereals, veg­
etable oils, meat, seafood, sugar, bananas, and oranges. These bench­
mark prices are representative of the global market and are determined 
by the largest exporter of each commodity. The nominal price index 
has been deflated by the U.S. CPI. The time series is shown in figure 1 
above. Real food commodity prices reached a peak in the 1970s, after 
which there was a steady decline until the early 2000s. The trend is again 
positive until the summer of 2012, and negative afterward. However, 
there have also been many fluctuations around the long­run evolution of 
commodity prices, with noticeable upward spikes in the second half of 
20
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Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
a. The production index aggregates the production of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans on a calorie-weighted 
basis. 
b. Variables are measured as 100 times the natural log of the global food commodity production index (see the 
text).
c. The production yield is defined as the ratio of food production to the area harvested.
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Figure 4. Global Food Commodity Production Index, 1961–2014a
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the 1970s, and in 1983, 1987–88, 1995–96, 2002–04, 2007–08, 2010, and 
2012. Overall, the standard deviation of the quarter­on­quarter change in 
real food commodity prices is 5.7 percent.17
Because our production index is limited to the four major staples, we 
have also constructed an alternative composite cereal price index contain­
ing only the prices of corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. This index, which 
is also shown in figure 1 above, is based on the trend production weights 
of the four commodities and is used below in another sensitivity check of 
the benchmark results. As observed in figure 1, the correlation with the 
International Monetary Fund’s broad index is very high, which is in line 
with the premise that prices for all food commodities tend to vary synchro­
nously. The variation of the cereal price index has, however, been higher 
than the broader food price index, with a quarterly standard deviation of 
7.8 percent.
The volume of seeds from harvests that are set aside for planting is also 
made available by the FAO on an annual basis. We have used the same 
procedure to allocate the annual data to a quarterly series, as described 
in subsection I.C for the production index. Other data are standard. Global 
oil production is obtained from the Oil & Gas Journal for the period before 
1973, and from the U.S. Energy Information Administration afterward, 
following Christiane Baumeister and Peersman (2013b). Similar to Kilian 
(2009), among others, the real oil price series is the refiner acquisition cost 
of imported crude oil, deflated by the U.S. CPI. To proxy global economic 
activity, we follow Baumeister and Peersman (2013a) by using the world 
industrial production index from the Netherlands Bureau for Economic 
Policy Analysis, which is backcasted for the period before 1991 using 
the growth rate of industrial production from the United Nations. Finally, 
U.S. macroeconomic data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of 
St. Louis’s FRED database.
II. VAR Results
In this section we describe the estimation of the VAR model. We show the 
identified shocks and their contribution to real food commodity prices, and 
discuss the dynamic effects on the U.S. economy. In subsection II.D, we 
examine the sensitivity and robustness of the results.
17. As a benchmark, the standard deviation of the change in real crude oil prices is 
11.3 percent over the same period.
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II.A. Inference
The benchmark VAR model for the global food commodity market 
and the U.S. economy has been estimated over the sample period 1963: 
Q1–2013:Q4. All variables are seasonally adjusted natural logarithms 
(multiplied by 100), except for the federal funds rate, which is measured 
in percent. Estimation in log levels gives consistent estimates and allows 
for implicit cointegrating relationships in the data.18 Based on the Akaike 
information criterion, we include five lags of the endogenous variables. 
However, the qualitative results are not sensitive to the lag order choice. In 
subsection II.D, we examine the robustness of the results across subsam­
ples. In the figures, we show the median estimates of the impulse responses, 
together with percentile error bands based on 10,000 draws. These are 
constructed as proposed by Sims and Tao Zha (1999).
II.B.  Identified Shocks and Contribution to Real Food  
Commodity Prices
Figure 5 shows the historical contribution of the identified global food 
commodity supply shocks to the evolution of real food commodity prices 
(solid line), as well as the contribution of all shocks implied by the VAR 
model (dashed line). Overall, the shocks explain approximately 10 percent 
of food commodity price volatility. The contribution of the shocks to real 
food commodity prices corroborates very well with several episodes that 
have been described as (un)favorable developments in food markets. For 
example, the VAR model identifies major favorable food supply shocks 
during the periods or years 1967–72, the mid­1980s, 1992, 1994, 1996–
2000, and 2004–05. In contrast, shocks to the global food production index 
have been unfavorable in the periods or years 1972–77, 1985–88, 1996, 
2000–03, 2005–07, and 2009–12. Almost all these episodes have been 
characterized by significantly falling or rising food commodity prices and 
correlate with many spikes discussed in subsection I.D.
18. See Sims, Stock, and Watson (1990) for inference in VAR models when some or 
all the variables have unit roots. In particular, they show that even when variables have 
stochastic trends and are cointegrated, the log levels specification gives consistent esti­
mates. Conversely, pretesting and imposing the unit root and cointegration relationships 
could lead to serious distortions when regressors almost have unit roots (Elliott 1998). 
Notice that the results are robust when we estimate the VAR with a linear (or quadratic) 
time trend.
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The cumulative contribution of the identified food commodity supply 
shocks to the surges in food commodity prices between 2005–07 and 
2009–12 has been more than 10 percentage points each time. Accordingly, 
unfavorable harvests contributed significantly to the so­called global food 
crisis between 2002 and 2011. Nevertheless, as observed in the figure, the 
bulk of the crisis has been caused by other shocks. This is not surprising 
and is in line with common perceptions and several studies that have 
analyzed the sources of the food crisis. A popular source that has been 
postulated by pundits is the considerable rise of food commodity demand 
induced by biofuels. Specifically, policy measures to encourage biofuels 
production—for example, renewable fuel standard mandates—and the 
simultaneous surge in oil prices appear to have triggered a persistent 
demand for corn and upward pressure on corn and food commodity prices 
(Abbott, Hurt, and Tyner 2011). For instance, the share of U.S. corn 
production used to produce ethanol increased from 12 percent in 2004 to 
almost 40 percent in 2010, and ethanol production absorbed 70 percent 
of the increase in global corn production over that period (Headey and 
–20
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
a. Calculated as the actual data minus the baseline of the VAR. 
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Figure 5. Historical Contribution of Identified Shocks to Real Food Commodity Prices, 
1963–2013
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Fan 2010).19 Examples of other shocks mentioned in the literature are the 
strong income growth in the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and 
China) during that period—which allowed citizens of these countries to 
incorporate larger quantities of cereals, meat, and other proteins into their 
diets (Zhang and Law 2010)—low interest rates, the depreciation of the 
U.S. dollar, and financial market speculation (Enders and Holt 2014). A 
final interesting feature revealed by the historical contribution of the identi­
fied global food commodity market disturbances is that favorable harvests 
seemed to have lowered food commodity prices by more than 10 percent 
in 2013.
II.C. Impact of Food Market Disruptions on the U.S. Economy
The impulse responses to a shock of 1 standard deviation in the global 
food production index are shown in figure 6. These should be interpreted 
as the dynamic effects of an unanticipated decline in the food production 
index on all the variables in the VAR, controlling for other changes in the 
economy that may also have an impact on the variables. The shock cor­
responds to a decline in the food production index of 4 percent. The drop 
in food production leads to a significant temporary rise in real (nominal) 
food commodity prices, which reaches a peak of approximately 1.7 per­
cent (1.8 percent) after one quarter, and a persistent decline in global eco­
nomic activity. Global oil production starts to decrease after approximately 
two quarters, which is in line with the pattern of the decline in global eco­
nomic activity, while the impact on the real price of oil is insignificant at 
all horizons.
Global food commodity production returns to the baseline after one 
quarter. This pattern, together with the persistent response of food com­
modity prices, is consistent with John Muth’s (1961) rational expectations 
model for commodity markets with speculation, and is at odds with the 
so­called cobweb theorem. Specifically, Muth (1961) shows that the intro­
duction of rational expectations into a linear model with a production lag 
of storable commodities and random shocks to production should gener­
ate first­order serial correlation in prices, while actual production is just a 
19. Notice that biofuels demand did not only strongly account for corn price increases 
during that period but also price increases in other staples. For example, the rapid expansion 
of the U.S. corn area by 23 percent in 2007 resulted in a 16 percent decline in the soybean 
area, which reduced soybean production, contributing to the strong rise in soybean prices 
(Mitchell 2008). Furthermore, European biofuels production has mainly been concentrated 
on biodiesel, which resulted in a crowding­out of the wheat area by oilseeds and hence 
higher wheat prices.
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perturbation around its steady state. Cobweb models, in contrast, pre­
dict negative serial correlation in prices and oscillatory commodity cycles 
(Ezekiel 1938). Our findings clearly support the former, which is in line 
with most empirical studies testing the rational­expectations, competitive­
storage model of agricultural commodities (Gouel 2012). The contempora­
neous decline in the volume of seeds that are set aside for planting, followed 
by a similar rise one year after the shock, also suggests that farmers use 
inventories to smooth sales and production over time.
U.S. real GDP U.S. real personal consumption
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a. The sample period is 1963:Q1–2013:Q4. The darker shading indicates the 16th and 84th percentile error 
bands; the lighter shading indicates the 5th and 95th percentile error bands.  
Figure 6. Impulse Responses to Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks: Benchmark 
VAR Resultsa (Continued )
JASMIEN DE WINNE and GERT PEERSMAN 205
The influence of global food market disruptions on the U.S. economy is 
considerable. In particular, real GDP starts to decrease after two quarters, 
reaching a maximum decline of 0.28 percent after five to six quarters, and 
then gradually returns to the baseline. Although the rise in real food com­
modity prices lasts for only four quarters, the decline in real GDP is still 
significant after two years. The macroeconomic consequences are thus 
very persistent. A similar pattern appears for the response of households’ 
real personal consumption expenditures. The shock in global food com­
modity markets also leads to a temporary surge in consumer prices with 
a peak of 0.16 percent, while there is a rise in the federal funds rate of 
8 basis points on impact.
The magnitudes of the effects are striking. According to a simple back­
of­the­envelope calculation, the responses of consumer prices and total 
consumption are about four to six times larger than the maximum direct 
influence that food commodities may have on the CPI and personal con­
sumption. More precisely, the rise of nominal commodity prices is 1.8 per­
cent at its peak. Given an average share of food commodities in final food 
products and beverages of 14.1 percent and a share of food and beverages 
in total household expenditures of 17.3 percent, the maximum direct effect 
of the rise in food commodity prices on consumer prices and total consump­
tion is approximately 0.04 to 0.05 percent.20 This suggests that indirect 
effects are important in magnifying the macroeconomic repercussions; that 
is, not only food prices but also other components of the CPI should increase 
after a surge in food commodity prices, while the decline in consumption 
cannot solely be the consequence of a discretionary income effect. In sec­
tion IV, we analyze this in more detail.
Whereas disturbances in food commodity markets have obviously not 
been the main driver of the U.S. business cycle, the identified global food 
market shocks did contribute to several post–World War II recessions. This 
can be observed in figure 7, which shows the cumulative contribution of 
the identified shocks to real GDP over time (solid line), the contribution of 
all shocks to real GDP implied by the benchmark VAR model (dashed line), 
20. The implicit assumption for the upper bound of the direct effect on total consumption 
is that the rise in food commodity prices is fully induced by higher prices for imported food 
commodities, which leads to a reduction in discretionary income of households to buy con­
sumption goods. In addition, households are assumed not to borrow or dissave in response to 
the shock. For the average share of food and beverages in total household expenditures over 
the sample period, and the share of food commodities in final food products and beverages, 
we refer to figure 2 and footnote 2.
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and the National Bureau of Economic Research’s recession periods (gray 
bars). Although our index only captures a subset of food market disrup­
tions, unfavorable shocks to global food production seem to have contrib­
uted to the recessions in 1974 (0.3 percent contribution to the decline in real 
GDP), 1982 (0.6 percent), the early 1990s (0.2 percent), 2001 (0.7 percent), 
and the Great Recession of 2008–09 (0.5 percent). In nonrecessionary peri­
ods, food commodity market shocks also had a meaningful influence on 
economic activity. For example, favorable food supply shocks increased 
real GDP by roughly 2 percent in the period 1967–72, by 1.7 percent in 
the mid­1980s, by 1.8 percent in 1997–2000, and by 1.7 percent between 
2003 and 2005. In sum, the macroeconomic repercussions of food market 
disturbances have been important for the U.S. economy.
II.D. The Sensitivity and Robustness of Benchmark Results
In section III, we examine the robustness of the results by using a narra­
tive approach that does not rely on the global food commodity production 
index and VAR methodology. But before doing this, we consider a set of 
alternative VAR specifications to assess the sensitivity of the results that 
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Figure 7. Historical Contribution of Identified Shocks to U.S. Real GDP, 1963–2013a
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are based on the production index. We also investigate whether the esti­
mations are picking up other effects and the stability of the results across 
subsamples.
DID WE IDENTIFY EXOGENOUS FOOD COMMODITY MARKET SHOCKS? Due to 
the time lag between the planting and the harvesting seasons, shocks to the 
global food commodity production index should in principle be exogenous 
with respect to the macroeconomy. In subsection I.C, we also argued that 
farmers cannot influence grain yields any more in the harvesting quarter, 
for example, by raising fertilization activity. As noted above, fertilizer 
applications must be implemented before or early in the growing season 
and may even lead to yield loss if they are implemented shortly before 
harvesting. Nevertheless, it is worth verifying whether the innovations 
are picking up other shocks, such as oil price or aggregate demand shocks. 
Furthermore, it is important to check whether the identified disturbances 
have effects on the economy other than via fluctuations in food commod­
ity markets. In particular, given that food production shocks are primarily 
the consequence of weather variation, changes in U.S. weather condi­
tions may simultaneously affect food production and economic activity.21 
Michael Boldin and Jonathan Wright (2015) find that unusual tempera­
tures have a statistically significant effect on U.S. real GDP growth in the 
first and second quarters. For example, several panel studies find signi­
ficant negative effects of hotter temperatures on agricultural output, and 
also on labor productivity and labor supply at the spatial level (Dell, 
Jones, and Olken 2014).22 Additionally, storms may distort the estima­
tions and exaggerate the role of food commodity markets in macro­
economic developments.
Overall, we do not find compelling support for the hypothesis that the 
innovations are picking up other shocks or are having meaningful direct 
effects on economic activity, other than through food commodity markets, 
for several reasons. First, a closer inspection of the impulse responses 
21. This evidence is usually only found for poor countries; several papers have found 
that temperature shocks have little effect on per capita income or industrial value­added 
output at the spatial level in rich countries (Dell, Jones, and Olken 2014).
22. Boldin and Wright (2015) do not find a significant impact of unusual snowfall on 
real GDP growth. Based on their estimations, they construct a counterfactual weather­
adjusted series for GDP growth. Unfortunately, we cannot use their series as a robustness 
check because the series only starts in 1990:Q1. The series also has the property that weather 
shocks cannot have a permanent effect on the level of real GDP. Any influence of weather 
conditions on the level of real GDP is therefore “neutralized” in subsequent quarters. This is 
clearly different from the pattern of the impulse responses in figure 6.
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shown in figure 6 conveys the perception that both issues probably do not 
have an important influence on the results. Specifically, global economic 
activity and U.S. real GDP only start to decline with a delay of at least two 
quarters after the identified food market disruptions. Put differently, the 
shocks are not reflected in economic activity on impact, which implies that 
the innovations are not aggregate demand shocks and that the direct effects 
of the underlying global weather conditions on the U.S. economy cannot be 
large.23 Similarly, global oil production only decreases after approximately 
three quarters, whereas the response of crude oil prices is never significant 
and is even slightly negative at longer horizons.
In addition, the return to the baseline of global food production after one 
quarter in the benchmark VAR confirms that the innovations do not cap­
ture endogenous responses to macroeconomic conditions. If food produc­
ers endogenously adjust their production yields to changes in economic 
activity, we should instead observe a persistent response function. Specifi­
cally, if farmers are able to augment (reduce) grain yields within one quar­
ter, this should also (and even more) be the case in the subsequent quarter. 
The absence of autocorrelation in the production response, however, is at 
odds with such endogenous behavior. Notice that it is also unlikely that the 
identified shocks capture an endogenous response of farmers to changes 
in expected (future) economic activity. This is illustrated in the top panel of 
figure 8. The panel shows the dynamic effects of food commodity supply 
shocks on equity prices (as measured by the S&P 500 index) and implied 
stock market volatility (as measured by the VIX volatility index). These 
impulse responses have been estimated by adding both variables one by 
one to the benchmark VAR model. If the innovations pick up shocks in 
expected economic activity or economic uncertainty, there should be a 
significant contemporaneous shift in equity prices or stock market vola­
tility. This is clearly not the case. Equity prices only start to decline with 
a delay, whereas the impact on stock market volatility is insignificant at 
all horizons.
In contrast to the macroeconomic and financial market variables, the 
contemporaneous responses of all the global food commodity market vari­
ables in the benchmark VAR are statistically significant. The patterns of the 
impulse response functions—that is, food production and prices shifting 
23. We also find no correlation between the series of the annualized food commodity 
supply shocks and the annual occurrence (–.09), the total number of deaths (.11), or the total 
dollar damage estimate (.07) of U.S. natural disasters reported in the EM­DAT database 
(http://www.emdat.be/database).
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Figure 8. Did We Identify Exogenous Food Commodity Market Shocks?
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in opposite directions—are also consistent with food supply shocks and 
are hard to reconcile with other types of disturbances. Moreover, as can 
be observed in the bottom panel of figure 8, the estimated innovations 
coincide quite well with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) 
forecast revisions. Since the early 1980s, the USDA’s World Agricul­
tural Outlook Board has regularly published projections of world annual 
grains production.24 These projections are always for the period May–April 
(known as the marketing year), and are an aggregate (millions of metric 
tons) of wheat, coarse grains (corn, sorghum, barley, oats, rye, millet, 
and mixed grains), and milled rice. In order to match with the calendar 
year frequency of the supply shocks obtained from the VAR, we take the 
sum of the USDA’s forecast revisions for the periods May–December 
and December–April. Despite the different compositions and weighting 
schemes, and the fact that the annual USDA forecast revisions also cap­
ture anticipated production innovations before the planting and harvest ing 
quarter, the correlation between both series (.53) turns out to be relatively 
high. In sum, both the impulse responses and shock series corroborate that 
we have identified global food commodity market disruptions, and it is 
unlikely that the innovations capture other important effects or endogenous 
responses to the macroeconomy.
This reasoning is also confirmed by the first sensitivity check reported 
in figure 9, which shows the results of several alternative VAR models. The 
first sensitivity check orders the global food production index after global 
oil production, the real price of oil, and global economic activity in the 
Cholesky decomposition. This implies that the identified food commodity 
production shocks are by construction orthogonal to all possible innova­
tions in global economic activity and the crude oil market. All variables 
are the same as in the benchmark VAR; to save space, however, we only 
show the impulse responses of six key variables. As observed in panel A 
of the figure, the impulse responses are nearly identical to the benchmark 
results.
As a second sensitivity test, we exclude U.S. food commodity produc­
tion from the global production index and reestimate the VAR model with 
this alternative index. Accordingly, we only identify external food com­
modity supply shocks, which could in principle not have a direct effect on 
24. An archive of these World Agricultural Supply and Demand Estimates can be found 
at http://usda.mannlib.cornell.edu/MannUsda/viewDocumentInfo.do?documentID=1194.
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Panel A. Alternative ordering of food production in VAR
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel B. Global food production index, excluding U.S. food production, 
as a measure of food production 
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Figure 9. Effects of Global Food Commodity Supply Shocks on Key Variables:  
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel C. Real cereal prices as a measure of the food commodity price
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel D. Global food production yields as a measure of food production
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
  Panel E. VAR estimated in first differences 
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Global food production Real food commodity prices
Panel F. FAVAR with six unobserved macroeconomic factors,
global food production, and real food commodity prices 
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a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the benchmark VAR (same as in figure 6); the dashed and dotted lines are results of the 
alternative VAR specification.  
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U.S. real GDP.25 The results, which are shown in panel B of figure 9, turn 
out to be very similar to the benchmark results. Notice that this is also 
the case when we additionally exclude food production of the neighboring 
countries from the global production index. These impulse responses are 
not shown in the figure, but are available upon request. In sum, it is unlikely 
that the identified innovations are picking up other shocks, or that there are 
significant direct effects of weather variation on the U.S. economy.
ALTERNATIVE VAR SPECIFICATIONS The results are also robust for several 
other perturbations to the benchmark VAR. More precisely, panel C of fig­
ure 9 exhibits the impulse responses of the benchmark VAR model esti­
mated with the real cereal price index instead of the broad food commodity 
price index. This index—which only contains the price of corn, wheat, rice, 
and soybeans—is less representative of the global food commodity market 
but corresponds more directly to the production index. As observed in the 
figure, cereal prices increase much more than the broad commodity price 
index after a decline in the production index. The maximum impact of a 
shock of 1 standard deviation on real cereal prices is 3.0 percent, while the 
rise in the broad index is 1.7 percent. However, the responses of all other 
variables are analogous to the benchmark effects. The results are thus not 
sensitive to the choice of the food price measure. Panel D of figure 9 shows 
the results with global food production yields as a measure of food produc­
tion, which also takes into account the area harvested (and planted). The 
results are again in line with the benchmark findings. The magnitude of the 
shock is somewhat lower, but the effects on real food commodity prices, 
real GDP, consumer prices, and all other variables are quite similar to the 
benchmark estimations.
Finally, we check the robustness of the results for the modeling choices 
we have made. Specifically, panel E of figure 9 shows the results of 
25. External food commodity supply shocks would not have a direct effect on U.S. real 
GDP unless there is a systematic correlation of non­U.S. food production shocks and U.S. 
food production. If this is the case, the correlation is probably small given the global level of 
our analysis. For example, the correlation between the estimated global food supply innova­
tions and the Multivariate El Niño Southern Oscillation Index, the Oceanic Niño Index, and 
a dummy variable based on the U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s 
definition of El Niños varies between -.10 and -.11. The correlation between food produc­
tion shocks excluding U.S. production and the El Niño variables varies between -.14 and 
-.16. None of the correlations are statistically significant. Notice that this exercise does not 
rule out that weather variation has an effect on economic activity beyond food commodity 
markets in other countries, which could in turn affect the U.S. economy via trade. In sec­
tion IV, however, we document that trade effects are relatively small and that export is not an 
important driver of the output consequences.
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the benchmark VAR model estimated in first differences, while panel F 
depicts the impulse responses of the key variables estimated with a factor­
augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR) model. Differencing the data 
does not account for cointegrating relationships in the data, but it is less 
likely that the results are distorted, because initial conditions explain an 
unreasonably large share of the low­frequency variation in the variables.26 
The advantage of a FAVAR model is that it uses information from a large 
number of time series, which reduces the possibility of an omitted vari­
able bias. We borrow the 207­variable FAVAR model that James Stock 
and Mark Watson (2016) have used to estimate the effects of oil market 
shocks. The FAVAR is estimated with five lags of two observed factors 
(that is, the global food production index and real food commodity prices) 
and six unobserved factors.27
The impulse responses of the alternative models in panels E and F of 
figure 9 have been accumulated and are shown in levels. Five interesting 
observations, which mostly apply to both models, are worth mentioning. 
First, the contemporaneous decline in global food production is somewhat 
greater than in the benchmark VAR. Second, there is a permanent decline 
in global food production, along with a very persistent rise in real food 
commodity prices. The finding that a bad harvest in one region leads to a 
long­run decline of food production in another region (despite higher food 
prices) is rather surprising. A possible explanation is that both models 
do not account for cointegrating relationships among the variables. Third, 
whereas the magnitudes are in the same neighborhood of the benchmark 
VAR results, the shapes of the output effects turn out to be different. In 
particular, the estimated peak effects of food market shocks on economic 
activity are approximately one year later in the FAVAR and the VAR esti­
mated in first differences, compared with the VARs estimated in log levels. 
26. VARs estimated with ordinary least squares or flat priors tend to attribute an implau­
sibly large share of the variation in the data to a deterministic component. The reason is that 
the criterion of fit does not penalize parameter values that make the initial conditions unrea­
sonable as draws from the model’s implied unconditional distribution. As a result, the model 
attributes the low­frequency behavior of the data to a process of return from the initial condi­
tions to the unconditional mean. This issue has been raised in the context of Mark Watson’s 
discussion of our paper. Also see Sims (2000) for a discussion on the role of initial conditions 
for the low­frequency variation in observed time series.
27. This model has also been used by Mark Watson for the discussion of our paper. We are 
grateful to him for sharing the code and data sets. The 207­variable time series consists of real 
activity, prices, productivity, earnings, interest rates, spreads, money, credit, assets, wealth, 
and oil market variables, as well as variables representing international activity. All variables 
are transformed to a stationary form. See Stock and Watson (2016) for details.
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Fourth, the impact of food commodity market disturbances on consumer 
prices seems to be much larger than the benchmark effects, particularly in 
the FAVAR model. Notice, however, that the uncertainty of the estimates is 
quite high, while the error bands overlap. Fifth and finally, the federal funds 
rate also rises more strongly in the FAVAR. Overall, although the shapes of 
several impulse responses are somewhat different, we can conclude that the 
magnitudes of the macroeconomic consequences of food commodity mar­
ket shocks are not sensitive to the modeling choices we have made.28
SUBSAMPLE ANALYSIS We now assess the robustness of the results across 
subsamples. A constraint on doing this is the relatively large number of 
variables and lags in the benchmark VAR model, which causes over para­
meterization problems for short sample periods. We therefore report the 
results of two exercises. First, we reestimate the benchmark VAR model 
for the sample periods 1963:Q1–1999:Q4 and 1985:Q1–2013:Q4, respec­
tively. The former sample period does not take into account the global food 
crisis of the 2000s and the subsequent collapse of food commodity prices, 
or the recent rising relevance of biofuels in energy consumption depicted 
in figure 2. The latter sample period, in contrast, excludes the major swings 
of food commodity prices in the 1970s and the so­called Great Inflation 
monetary policy regime.
The results for the subsamples are shown in figure 10. Interestingly, 
despite the reduced relevance of food consumption in total household 
expenditures over time, the effects of global food commodity supply shocks 
on real GDP, personal consumption, and consumer prices are quite similar 
for both subsamples and are comparable to the benchmark VAR results. 
A possible explanation is the increased share of biofuels in energy con­
sumption in recent times, which could have offset the declining share of 
food consumption in household expenditures. In particular, the increased 
ethanol production in the second half of the 2000s could have led to a 
28. By estimating food production equations (with all lagged VAR variables as indepen­
dent variables), and implementing the residuals in a simple local projection framework, we 
have also explored whether the existence of nonlinearities could have influenced the estima­
tion results. Specifically, we have examined whether the macroeconomic consequences are 
different (i) when we allow food production to react differently to increases and decreases 
of the lagged independent variables, (ii) depending on the quarter of the shock, and (iii) for 
unfavorable versus favorable shocks. Overall, we do not find evidence that nonlinearities 
have distorted the average effects reported in this paper. We do find support for the hypoth­
esis that unfavorable shocks have stronger macroeconomic effects than favorable shocks 
(respectively greater and smaller than the average effects). The standard errors are, however, 
relatively large. It is worth investigating this more carefully in future research.
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Figure 10. Subsample Analysis Based on Benchmark VAR:  
1963–99 versus 1985–2013a
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a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results for the period 1985:Q1–2013:Q4; the dashed and dotted lines are the results for the period 
1963:Q1–1999:Q4. 
Figure 10. Subsample Analysis Based on Benchmark VAR: 1963–99 versus  
1985–2013a (Continued )
tighter link between agricultural and energy prices, magnifying the con­
sequences of food commodity market disruptions for the U.S. economy 
at the end of the sample.
An enhanced link between food commodity markets and energy prices is 
confirmed by the second exercise to assess time variation. For this exercise, 
we borrow results from Peersman, Sebastian Rüth, and Wouter Van der 
Veken (2016). More specifically, elaborating on the present study, Peersman, 
Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) estimate a more parsimonious version 
of the benchmark VAR across subsamples—as well as time­varying 
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parameter VARs with stochastic volatility, in the spirit of Giorgio Primiceri 
(2005)—to examine whether crude oil and food commodities have become 
more closely linked in recent periods. The VAR used by Peersman, 
Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) contains the global food production 
index, real cereal prices, global crude oil production, the real price of 
crude oil, and global economic activity. Within the VAR model, global 
food commodity supply and crude oil supply shocks are identified. The 
results reveal that unfavorable food commodity supply shocks have no 
impact on global crude oil prices until 2003, after which their impact starts 
to gradually rise over time. A similar story emerges for oil supply shocks; 
that is, oil supply shocks have no significant effects on real cereal prices 
until 2003, after which the effects become significant. Hence, crude oil 
and food commodities seem to have become closer substitutes over time, 
in line with the rising share of biofuels in petroleum consumption.
In the first panel of figure 11, we reproduce Peersman, Rüth, and Van der 
Veken’s (2016) results for the sample periods 1985:Q1–2002:Q4 and 
2003:Q1–2014:Q4 for global food commodity supply shocks.29 As can be 
observed in the figure, a food market disturbance that raises real cereal 
prices also triggers an immediate shift of crude oil prices in the post­2003 
period. In the second panel, we show the macroeconomic consequences of 
the shocks in both periods by adding a set of U.S. variables one by one 
to the five­variable VAR model. Some caution when interpreting the mag­
nitudes of the responses is required because the rise in real cereal prices is 
more persistent in the first subsample period. If we take this into account, 
we can again conclude that the consequences for real GDP, personal con­
sumption, and consumer prices have not dramatically changed over time. 
But this is not the case for CPI energy. In particular, food commodity 
supply shocks turn out to have a significant impact on CPI energy in the 
recent period, in contrast to an insignificant effect in the period before 
2003. Put differently, due to the rising share of biofuels in energy consump­
tion, food market disturbances currently also have inflationary effects via 
energy prices.
29. Notice that the VARs given by Peersman, Rüth, and Van der Veken (2016) are esti­
mated with real cereal prices because cereal prices are more directly linked to biofuels. It is 
also easier to compare the magnitudes with real crude oil prices and examine their interplay. 
The impulse responses in both periods have been normalized to the maximum rise of real 
cereal prices obtained in subsection II.D. Furthermore, because the VAR model does not 
contain the volume of seeds that are set aside for planting, there is one extra year of data 
available at the end of the sample period relative to the benchmark VAR in the present paper.
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Figure 11. Subsample Analysis Based on Smaller VAR: 1985–2002 versus 2003–14a
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III.  A Narrative Approach to Identifying  
Food Market Disturbances
As an alternative approach to examine the consequences of food commod­
ity market disruptions for the U.S. economy, we rely in this section on 
historical documents to identify exogenous food market shocks. Narrative 
methods to address the identification problem have a long­standing tradi­
tion in macroeconomics. For example, they were used by Romer and Romer 
(1989) to estimate the effects of monetary policy changes. By examining 
the minutes of the Federal Open Market Committee’s policy deliberations, 
they identify six episodes of large independent restrictive monetary policy 
shocks, which are then included as a dummy variable in an autoregressive 
model to estimate the macroeconomic consequences. Similarly, by read­
ing through Bloomberg Businessweek, Ramey and Shapiro (1998) create 
a dummy variable capturing major military buildups. The dummy is then 
embedded in a standard VAR to examine the impact of government spend­
ing shocks. Ramey (2011) extends this approach by creating a quantitative 
narrative series of exogenous news shocks on government spending. Romer 
and Romer (2010) use the narrative record, including presidential speeches 
and congressional reports, to identify major tax policy shocks. Perhaps most 
closely related to our application, Hamilton (1983, 2003) considers a num­
ber of historical episodes when changes in oil prices were almost solely 
driven by exogenous disturbances to supply that had little to do with macro­ 
economic conditions—for example, political and military conflicts in oil­
producing countries—to estimate the dynamic effects of oil market shocks.
Whereas VARs are constrained by relatively small information sets, 
the advantage of a narrative approach is the possibility of incorporating a 
large amount of information, including expectations. It also requires fewer 
assumptions, and there is no need to identify a structural form. However, 
it implies judgment on the part of the researcher, whereas shocks may still 
contain endogenous components. It can thus be considered a useful comple­
mentary analysis for the VAR results based on the global food production 
index. In subsection III.A, we describe the narrative approach to identify 
exogenous food commodity market shocks. Subsection III.B discusses the 
estimation method, and subsection III.C presents the results.
III.A.  Historical Episodes of Major Exogenous  
Food Commodity Market Shocks
To quantify the macroeconomic consequences of changes in food com­
modity prices, it is crucial to identify changes in food commodity prices 
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that are unrelated to the state of the economy—that is, movements for 
which the proximate causes are disturbances in global food commodity 
markets. We rely on FAO reports, newspaper articles, disaster databases, 
and several other online sources to identify historical episodes of such 
movements. The task is daunting, given the global level of the analysis. 
Continuous, and many times even conflicting, events affect food com­
modity markets somewhere in the world. We therefore only include epi­
sodes that fulfill these criteria:
—There needs to be an event that is important enough to affect food 
commodity markets at the global level, such as weather shocks in a major 
food­producing region, or unanticipated news on the volume of global 
food production (for example, a sizable revision of expected agricultural 
production by the USDA).
—The event should have an unambiguous significant effect on global 
food commodity prices. A shift in commodity prices is considered to be 
significant if either the quarterly change in food commodity prices or 
the accumulated change over two subsequent quarters differs by at least 1 
standard deviation from the sample mean.30
—There should be no developments in the macroeconomy, alternative 
events, or macroeconomic news that could also have a discernible impact 
on food commodity prices. For example, we do not consider admissible 
food market events if there is simultaneously a significant shift in crude oil 
prices (1 standard deviation from its sample mean) or in economic activity 
(for example, a U.S. or global recession). Put differently, we eliminate or 
minimize possible endogenous movements in food commodity prices to 
current or future fluctuations in the business cycle; that is, the event in 
food commodity markets must be the proximate cause of the price shift.31 
No ambiguous cases are selected as episodes.
A narrative approach to identifying exogenous shocks involves judg­
ment calls, which is a concern we acknowledge. However, we believe that 
we have identified 13 episodes that could reasonably be interpreted as 
major exogenous food commodity market disturbances that are unrelated 
to the state of the economy. The estimation results are not driven by a 
30. The standard deviations of the quarterly change in food commodity prices and accu­
mulated change over two subsequent quarters are 5.7 and 9.1 percent, respectively, while the 
means are -0.31 and -0.62 percent, respectively.
31. Crude oil is not only used in the food production process or a close substitute for 
food commodities to produce energy products. A shift in crude oil prices could also signal 
changes in (expected) demand for commodities more generally.
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single episode because they are relatively similar if we exclude individual 
events from the estimations. Six episodes are unfavorable food market dis­
ruptions, whereas we have detected seven favorable shocks to food com­
modity markets. Examples of unambiguously unfavorable shocks include 
the Russian Wheat Deal (combined with a failed monsoon in southeast 
Asia) in the summer of 1972 and the more recent Russian and Ukrainian 
droughts of 2010 and 2012. Conversely, a number of unanticipated signifi­
cant upward revisions in the expected harvest volume (for example, in 
1975, 1996, and 2004) can clearly be classified as episodes of favorable 
food market shocks. The dates, as well as brief descriptions of all global 
food commodity market events, are reported in table 1. A detailed motiva­
tion for the selected quarters can be found in the online appendix to the 
paper. In every case, we attempt to give explanations and quotations so 
other researchers can see our reasoning for classifying the episodes as food 
commodity market disruptions. To give an idea of our approach, the appen­
dix at the end of this paper reproduces the motivation for the most recent 
shock that we identified in 2012:Q3.
III.B. Estimation Method
There is no one­to­one mapping between the true structural shocks and 
the observed changes in food commodity prices in these 13 episodes. We 
therefore first construct a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 for the 
unfavorable food market disturbances that we have identified and is equal 
to -1 for favorable food market events. The idea is that this dummy vari­
able series is a noisy measure of the true food market shocks and can be 
used as an external instrument to identify exogenous changes in global 
food commodity prices. In this context, Karel Mertens and Morten Ravn 
(2013) show that a series based on narrative evidence is robust to many 
types of measurement problems and is a valid instrument, as long as the 
series is contemporaneously correlated with the structural shock and is 
contemporaneously uncorrelated with all other structural shocks in the 
economy.
In the next step, we examine the dynamic effects of shocks to global 
food commodity prices on the U.S. economy using Jordà’s (2005) local 
projection method for estimating impulse responses.32 The advantage of the 
local projection method is that it is more robust to misspecification than 
32. A similar approach has been used by Ramey and Zubairy (2014) to estimate the 
effects of narratively identified government spending shocks.
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s n
or
m
al
ly
 
pa
id
 o
n 
ex
po
rts
.
A
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 th
e 
gl
ob
al
 a
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l s
ec
to
r w
as
 se
ve
re
ly
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
m
on
so
on
 fa
il­
u
re
 in
 m
os
t o
f s
ou
th
ea
st 
A
sia
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
su
m
m
er
,
 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 fo
llo
w
ed
 b
y 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
dr
y 
w
ea
th
er
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 a
ut
um
n 
an
d 
ea
rly
 w
in
te
r. 
R
ic
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 
Ca
m
bo
di
a,
 In
di
a,
 M
al
ay
sia
, a
nd
 T
ha
ila
nd
 b
y 
29
 p
er
ce
nt
, 9
 p
er
ce
nt
, 1
3 
pe
rc
en
t, 
 
an
d 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
, r
es
pe
ct
iv
el
y.
In
 1
97
2:
Q3
 an
d 1
97
2:Q
4, 
rea
l c
ere
al 
pri
ce
s r
os
e b
y 9
.7 
pe
rce
nt 
an
d 1
6.5
 pe
rce
nt,
 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 a
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
1.
6 
pe
rc
en
t 
in
 1
97
2,
 c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 a
 ri
se
 o
f 9
.2
 p
er
ce
nt
 a
nd
 7
.4
 p
er
ce
nt
 in
 1
97
1 
an
d 
19
73
, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
(co
n
tin
ue
d)
19
75
:Q
2
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
10
.9
 
-
9.
9
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 im
pr
o
v
ed
 e
st
im
at
e 
of
 w
o
rl
d 
gr
ai
n 
pr
o
du
ct
io
n
In
 A
pr
il 
19
75
, t
he
 U
SD
A 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
a 
sig
ni
fic
an
t i
nc
re
as
e 
in
 w
or
ld
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(th
e p
rev
iou
s f
ore
ca
st 
wa
s i
n D
ec
em
be
r 1
97
4),
 in
dic
ati
ng
 an
 ea
sin
g o
f t
he
 tig
ht 
su
p­
pl
y 
an
d 
de
m
an
d 
ba
la
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 in
 M
ay
 1
97
5,
 th
e 
U
SD
A 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
its
 U
.S
. w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
es
tim
at
e 
fo
r 1
97
5 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
M
ay
 fi
el
d 
co
nd
iti
on
s. 
A 
re
co
rd
 w
he
at
 h
ar
ve
st 
w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d.
 In
 re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
an
nu
al
 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 6
.9
 p
er
ce
nt
 re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r.
19
75
:Q
4
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
7
-
10
.7
O
pt
im
ist
ic
 ri
ce
 fo
re
ca
st
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f v
er
y 
fa
v
o
ra
bl
e 
m
on
so
on
 se
as
on
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
97
5,
 th
er
e w
er
e e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f a
 re
co
rd
 ri
ce
 cr
op
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f a
 fa
vo
r­
ab
le
 m
on
so
on
 se
as
on
. A
s a
 c
on
se
qu
en
ce
, r
ic
e 
pr
ic
es
 st
ar
te
d 
to
 d
ec
re
as
e 
fro
m
 
O
ct
ob
er
 1
97
5 
on
w
ar
d 
w
hi
ch
 is
 th
e s
ta
rt 
of
 th
e h
ar
ve
sti
ng
 se
as
on
. R
ea
l c
er
ea
l p
ric
es
 
fe
ll 
by
 1
9 
pe
rc
en
t o
ve
r t
w
o 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 q
ua
rte
rs
. E
x 
po
st,
 1
97
5 
pr
ov
ed
 in
de
ed
 to
 b
e 
a 
v
er
y 
fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
ric
e 
ye
ar
 fo
r I
nd
ia
, J
ap
an
 a
nd
 T
ha
ila
nd
, w
ith
 a
n 
ac
ce
le
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
yi
el
ds
 re
la
tiv
e t
o 
19
74
 b
y 
23
 p
er
ce
nt
, 7
 p
er
ce
nt
, a
nd
 1
4 
pe
rc
en
t, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
19
77
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
20
.9
-
12
.9
Pr
ed
ic
tio
ns
 o
f r
ec
o
rd
 U
.
S.
 a
nd
 S
ov
ie
t h
ar
v
es
ts
Se
ve
ra
l f
av
or
ab
le
 fo
od
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
fo
re
ca
sts
 w
er
e 
pu
bl
ish
ed
 th
ro
ug
ho
ut
 Ju
ly
 a
nd
 
A
ug
us
t 1
97
7:
 p
re
di
ct
io
ns
 o
f r
ec
or
d 
U
.S
. c
or
n 
cr
op
s (
Ju
ly 
19
77
); 
inc
rea
sed
 fo
rec
ast
s 
o
f w
or
ld
 w
he
at
 a
nd
 fe
ed
 g
ra
in
s p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
(Ju
ly 
19
77
); 
ne
ws
 on
 re
co
rd 
So
vie
t w
he
at 
ha
rv
es
t (A
ug
us
t 1
97
7);
 an
d p
red
ict
ion
s o
f r
ec
ord
 U
.S.
 so
yb
ea
ns
 cr
op
s (
Au
gu
st 
19
77
).
19
77
:Q
4
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
8.
0
 
15
.6
R
ec
or
d 
gr
ai
n 
ha
rv
es
ts
 d
id
 n
ot
 m
at
er
ia
liz
e
D
es
pi
te
 e
xp
ec
ta
tio
ns
 o
f r
ec
or
d 
ha
rv
es
ts 
in
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 q
ua
rte
r, 
gl
ob
al
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
c­
tio
n 
tu
rn
ed
 o
ut
 to
 b
e 
be
lo
w
 th
e 
tre
nd
 in
 1
97
7 
as
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 u
nf
av
or
ab
le
 w
ea
th
er
 
co
n
di
tio
ns
 in
 th
e 
m
ajo
r p
rod
uc
ing
 ar
eas
. In
 N
ov
em
be
r 1
97
7, 
the
 Fi
na
nc
ia
l T
im
es
 
an
n
o
u
n
ce
d 
th
at
 th
e 
So
vi
et
 c
ro
p 
w
ou
ld
 b
e 
ro
ug
hl
y 
10
 p
er
ce
nt
 b
el
ow
 th
e 
la
te
st 
es
ti­
m
at
e 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
by
 th
e 
U
SD
A
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
lo
w
er
ed
 
its
 e
sti
m
at
e 
of
 w
or
ld
 w
he
at
 o
ut
pu
t b
y 
2 
to
 3
 p
er
ce
nt
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
So
vi
et
 w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 5
 p
er
ce
nt
 c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 y
ea
r. 
Ch
in
es
e 
w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
18
 p
er
ce
nt
; a
nd
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 b
y 
5 
pe
rc
en
t. 
It 
is 
cl
ea
r t
ha
t t
hi
s c
am
e 
as
 a
n 
un
ex
pe
ct
ed
 sh
oc
k 
in
 1
97
7:
Q4
, 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
ex
tre
m
el
y 
op
tim
ist
ic
 fo
re
ca
sts
 in
 1
97
7:
Q3
.
19
84
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
-
10
.4
-
14
.1
Fa
v
o
ra
bl
e 
w
ea
th
er
 in
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
a 
an
d 
ex
ce
pt
io
na
lly
 g
oo
d 
ce
re
a
l h
ar
v
es
t i
n 
w
es
te
rn
 E
ur
o
pe
In
 Ju
ly
 1
98
4,
 th
e 
U
SD
A 
im
pr
ov
ed
 it
s J
un
e 
es
tim
at
e 
fo
r U
.S
. w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n,
 
an
d 
pr
ed
ic
te
d 
re
co
rd
 g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
or
ld
w
id
e.
 M
uc
h 
of
 th
is
 in
cr
ea
se
 w
as
 a
 
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f t
he
 N
or
th
 A
m
er
ic
an
 re
co
ve
ry
 fr
om
 th
e 
sh
ar
p 
de
cl
in
e 
of
 1
98
3 
as
 a
 
co
n
se
qu
en
ce
 o
f i
nc
re
as
ed
 p
la
nt
in
g,
 a
s w
el
l a
s f
av
or
ab
le
 w
ea
th
er
.
 
W
es
te
rn
 E
ur
op
e 
al
so
 h
ad
 e
xc
ep
tio
na
lly
 g
oo
d 
ha
rv
es
ts
 o
f c
er
ea
ls
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
U
.S
. m
ai
ze
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
ro
se
 c
on
si
de
ra
bl
y,
 
by
 a
bo
ut
 8
4 
pe
rc
en
t. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 C
hi
na
, I
nd
ia
, a
nd
 F
ra
nc
e 
by
 8
 p
er
ce
nt
, 3
3 
pe
rc
en
t, 
an
d 
6 
pe
rc
en
t, 
re
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
1.
4 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
19
84
, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 th
e 
la
rg
es
t a
nn
ua
l r
is
e 
si
nc
e 
th
e 
19
60
s.
19
88
:Q
4
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
5
 
-
9.
4
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f a
 g
lo
ba
l s
ur
ge
 in
 w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n
In
 D
ec
em
be
r 1
98
8,
 it
 w
as
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
th
at
 
w
o
rld
w
id
e 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
w
as
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
to
 ri
se
 c
on
sid
er
ab
ly
 in
 1
98
9,
 b
ec
au
se
, 
am
o
n
g 
ot
he
r f
ac
to
rs
, t
he
re
 w
as
 a
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 th
e 
U
.S
. s
et
­
as
id
e 
of
 a
ra
bl
e 
la
nd
, f
ro
m
 2
7.
5 
pe
rc
en
t t
o 
on
ly
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t o
f t
he
 w
he
at
 a
cr
ea
ge
 in
 
th
e 
ne
xt
 y
ea
r, 
w
hi
ch
 w
as
 a
 fa
rm
 p
ol
ic
y 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 th
e 
19
88
 d
ro
ug
ht
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (c
od
ifie
d i
n t
he
 D
isa
ste
r R
eli
ef 
an
d E
me
rge
nc
y 
A
ss
ist
an
ce
 A
ct
 o
f 1
98
8).
 In
 
re
sp
on
se
 to
 d
ro
ug
ht
­
sh
or
te
ne
d 
cr
op
 in
ve
nt
or
ie
s, 
th
e 
19
89
 v
er
sio
n 
of
 th
e 
fa
rm
 b
ill
 
w
as
 e
x
pe
ct
ed
 to
 e
n
co
u
ra
ge
 m
o
re
 c
ro
p 
pl
an
tin
g.
 W
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 1
98
9 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
in
 a
ll 
la
rg
e 
w
he
at
­
pr
od
uc
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
 (C
hin
a, 
6 p
erc
en
t; F
ran
ce
, 1
0 p
erc
en
t; I
nd
ia,
 
17
 p
er
ce
nt
; t
he
 U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
, 1
2 
pe
rc
en
t; 
th
e 
U
SS
R,
 1
1 
pe
rc
en
t).
 E
x p
os
t, a
nn
ua
l 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 m
or
e 
th
an
 1
0 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
19
89
.
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 O
ve
rv
ie
w
 o
f N
ar
ra
tiv
e 
Fo
od
 C
om
m
od
ity
 M
ar
ke
t S
ho
ck
s,
 1
97
2–
20
12
 (C
on
ti
nu
ed
)
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 fo
od
 
co
m
m
o
di
ty
 p
ric
es
 (p
erc
en
t)
Pe
ri
od
Ty
pe
O
n 
im
pa
ct
Af
ter
 on
e q
ua
rte
r
Fo
o
d 
co
m
m
od
ity
 m
ar
ke
t e
ve
n
t
19
95
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
6.
6
 
 
7.
8
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ow
n
w
a
rd
 re
v
isi
on
 o
f w
o
rl
d 
ce
re
a
l e
st
im
at
es
In
 1
99
5:
Q3
, th
ere
 w
ere
 la
rge
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
re
vi
sio
ns
 o
f 1
99
5 
w
or
ld
 ce
re
al
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n.
 
Th
is 
w
as
 e
sp
ec
ia
lly
 th
e 
ca
se
 fo
r w
he
at
 a
nd
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
ns
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 (p
oo
r w
ea
the
r c
on
dit
ion
s, 
pre
do
mi
na
ntl
y h
ot 
an
d d
ry 
we
ath
er 
du
rin
g e
arl
y 
Se
pt
em
be
r) 
an
d t
he
 C
om
mo
nw
ea
lth
 of
 In
de
pe
nd
en
t S
tat
es,
 an
d f
or 
wh
ea
t p
rod
uc
tio
n 
in
 A
rg
en
tin
a 
an
d 
Ch
in
a.
 In
 C
en
tra
l A
m
er
ic
a,
 a
 b
el
ow
­
n
o
rm
al
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
n 
cr
op
 w
as
 
in
 p
ro
sp
ec
t i
n 
M
ex
ic
o 
du
e 
to
 a
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 re
du
ce
d 
pl
an
tin
gs
 a
nd
 d
ry
 w
ea
th
er
 
in
 p
ar
ts 
of
 th
e 
co
un
try
.
 
In
 re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cl
in
ed
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
 
an
d 
Ru
ss
ia
 b
y 
6 
pe
rc
en
t, 
an
d 
in
 A
rg
en
tin
a 
by
 1
6 
pe
rc
en
t. 
M
ex
ic
an
 co
rn
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
st
ag
na
te
d 
in
 1
99
5,
 b
ut
 U
.S
. c
or
n 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 2
6 
pe
rc
en
t. 
A
nn
ua
l g
lo
ba
l 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
fo
ur
 m
ajo
r s
tap
les
 ul
tim
ate
ly 
de
cli
ne
d b
y 2
.6 
pe
rce
nt 
in 
19
95
.
19
96
:Q
3
Fa
vo
ra
bl
e
 
-
4.
5
-
12
.5
Ex
pe
ct
at
io
ns
 o
f e
xc
el
le
nt
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l h
ar
v
es
t
Th
e 
FA
O
 is
su
ed
 a
 fi
rs
t p
ro
vi
sio
na
l f
av
or
ab
le
 fo
re
ca
st 
fo
r w
or
ld
 1
99
6 
ce
re
al
 o
ut
pu
t 
(6.
5 p
erc
en
t u
p f
rom
 th
e p
rev
iou
s y
ea
r) 
in 
Ju
ne
 19
96
. T
he
 la
rg
es
t i
nc
re
as
e 
w
as
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 in
 c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
ns
 o
ut
pu
t, 
m
os
tly
 in
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
co
un
tri
es
. A
dd
iti
on
al
ly
,
 
w
he
at
 o
ut
pu
t w
as
 fo
re
ca
st 
to
 in
cr
ea
se
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
,
 
an
d 
ric
e 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
to
 ri
se
 m
ar
­
gi
na
lly
.
 
In
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
99
6,
 th
e 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l G
ra
in
s C
ou
nc
il 
in
cr
ea
se
d 
its
 fo
re
ca
st 
(co
mp
are
d w
ith
 a 
mo
nth
 ea
rli
er)
 fo
r 1
99
6–
97
 gl
ob
al 
wh
ea
t p
rod
uc
tio
n i
n r
esp
on
se 
to
 a
 c
on
fir
m
at
io
n 
of
 fa
vo
ra
bl
e 
ha
rv
es
ts 
in
 th
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
H
em
isp
he
re
 a
nd
 e
xc
el
le
nt
 
pr
os
pe
ct
s i
n 
th
e 
So
ut
he
rn
 H
em
isp
he
re
.
(co
n
tin
ue
d)
20
02
:Q
3
U
nf
av
or
ab
le
 
 
9.
4
 
10
.7
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
ow
n
w
a
rd
 re
v
ise
d 
gl
ob
al
 c
er
ea
l e
st
im
at
es
Th
e 
FA
O
’s 
Ju
ly
 2
00
2 
fo
re
ca
st 
po
in
te
d 
to
 a
 g
lo
ba
l c
er
ea
l o
ut
pu
t w
hi
ch
 w
as
 c
on
sid
er
­
ab
ly
 le
ss
 th
an
 th
e 
pr
ev
io
us
 fo
re
ca
st 
in
 M
ay
; i
t w
ou
ld
 b
e 
th
e 
sm
al
le
st 
w
he
at
 c
ro
p 
si
nc
e 
19
95
. T
he
 d
ow
nw
ar
d 
re
vi
sio
n 
w
as
 m
os
tly
 a
 re
su
lt 
of
 a
 d
et
er
io
ra
tio
n 
of
 p
ro
­
du
ct
io
n 
pr
os
pe
ct
s f
or
 se
ve
ra
l o
f t
he
 m
ajo
r w
he
at 
cro
ps
 ar
ou
nd
 th
e g
lob
e b
ec
au
se 
o
f a
dv
er
se
 w
ea
th
er
 in
 th
e 
N
or
th
er
n 
H
em
isp
he
re
 o
r f
or
 p
la
nt
in
g 
in
 th
e 
So
ut
he
rn
 
H
em
is
ph
er
e.
 T
he
 fo
re
ca
st
 fo
r g
lo
ba
l c
oa
rs
e 
gr
ai
n 
ou
tp
ut
 w
as
 a
lso
 re
vi
se
d 
do
w
n­
w
ar
d 
sin
ce
 th
e 
la
st 
re
po
rt 
m
ai
nl
y 
be
ca
us
e 
of
 d
ry
 w
ea
th
er
 c
on
di
tio
ns
 in
 R
us
sia
. I
n 
Se
pt
em
be
r, 
th
e A
us
tra
lia
n 
Bu
re
au
 o
f A
gr
ic
ul
tu
ra
l a
nd
 R
es
ou
rc
e 
Ec
on
om
ic
s a
nd
 
Sc
ie
nc
es
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 th
at
 d
ro
ug
ht
 w
ou
ld
 sl
as
h 
th
e 
co
un
try
’s 
w
in
te
r g
ra
in
 p
ro
du
c­
tio
n.
 A
us
tra
lia
 is
 o
ne
 o
f t
he
 to
p 
fiv
e 
w
he
at
 e
xp
or
te
rs
. I
n 
re
tro
sp
ec
t, 
U
.S
. w
he
at
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
by
 1
8 
pe
rc
en
t i
n 
20
02
, a
nd
 A
us
tra
lia
n 
w
he
at
 p
ro
du
ct
io
n 
de
cr
ea
se
d 
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VARs because it does not impose implicit dynamic restrictions on the shape 
of the impulse responses, and not all variables are required to be included 
in all equations. In addition, joint or point­wise analytic inference is sim­
ple, and it is easy to incorporate instrumental variables.33
For each variable and each horizon, we estimate the following single 
regression model:
2 ,1 1z L z L X RFCPt h h h t h t h t t h( ) ( )( ) = α + l + y + q + ε+ - - +
where z is the variable of interest at horizon h. We consider real food com­
modity prices and a set of variables representing the U.S. economy: real 
GDP, real personal consumption, CPI, and the federal funds rate. The term 
αh is a vector of deterministic terms—a constant, linear, and quadratic time 
trend—lh(L) and yh(L) are polynomials in the lag operator (L = 5), and X is 
a set of control variables. Although the control variables do not have to be 
the same for each regression, we include all other z variables. Finally, qh is 
the estimated response of z at horizon h to a shock in real food commodity 
prices (RFCPt) at period t. Because real food commodity prices may be 
partly endogenous to the U.S. economy, we estimate equation 2 with the 
narrative dummy and the first lag of the dummy as external instruments for 
RFCPt. The reason that we also use the first lag of the narrative dummy as 
an instrument is that some of the episodes encompass more than one quar­
ter (see the online appendix). The F statistic of the instruments (dummy 
and lagged dummy) is 12.6. The t statistics of the dummy and the lagged 
dummy are 4.9 and 1.9, respectively.
III.C. Narrative Results
The estimated impulse responses to a 1 percent increase in real food 
commodity prices are shown in figure 12. Because the error terms follow 
33. Because this method imposes fewer restrictions, the estimates are often less pre­
cise and more erratic at longer horizons because of a loss of efficiency (Ramey 2016). 
If the data­generating process is adequately captured, impulse responses of VARs are in 
contrast optimal at all horizons. We have therefore also estimated two VAR models based on 
the narrative food commodity market shocks. On one hand, we have embedded the episodes 
as dummy variables in a standard VAR to estimate the macroeconomic effects, an approach 
similar to that taken by Ramey and Shapiro (1998). On the other hand, we have used the 
dummy variable as an instrument to identify food commodity prices shocks within a VAR 
model, as proposed by Mertens and Ravn (2013). The results of both exercises, which are 
available upon request, confirm the conclusions of the local projections.
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Figure 12. Impulse Responses to Narrative Food Commodity Supply Shocks:  
Local Projectionsa
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some form of a moving­average structure, with an order that is a function 
of horizon h, they are serially correlated. Accordingly, we calculate and 
report Newey–West standard error bands in all figures. The rise in real food 
commodity prices reaches a peak of 1.9 percent after 3 to 4 quarters. This 
corresponds to a rise in nominal food commodity prices of approximately 
2.1 percent, a magnitude that is somewhat higher than the maximum effect 
in the benchmark VAR. The narratively identified shocks also have a much 
more persistent impact on food commodity prices because real food com­
modity prices only return to the baseline after approximately 12 quarters, 
compared with 4 quarters in the benchmark VAR.
The persistent rise in real food commodity prices is also reflected in 
more persistent effects on the U.S. economy relative to the benchmark VAR 
results. Real GDP and real personal consumption decrease by approx­
imately 0.3 percent, reaching their peak after 10 quarters. Taking into 
account the more persistent and slightly greater rise in global food com­
modity prices, the magnitudes of the consequences for the real economy 
are comparable to the VAR results reported in section II. In contrast, the 
impact on consumer prices and the monetary policy response seems to 
be stronger for the narrative shocks. Specifically, consumer prices and 
the federal funds rate increase by 0.4 and 0.2 percent, respectively, which 
is roughly twice the impact obtained with the VAR model and global food 
production index.
Overall, despite being a very different approach, the results of the nar­
ratively identified food commodity market disturbances confirm the main 
messages of the VAR analysis. Hence, we can safely conclude that the 
repercussions of disruptions in global food commodity markets for the 
U.S. economy are compelling. In the next section, we examine the pass­
through in more detail.
IV.  The Pass-Through to Consumer Prices  
and Economic Activity
In subsection II.C, we argued that several indirect effects should be at play, 
amplifying the macroeconomic consequences of food market disruptions. 
In particular, not only food prices but also other components of the CPI 
should increase after a surge in food commodity prices, while the decline 
in consumption cannot solely be driven by the direct loss in purchasing 
power. In other words, there is more than just a discretionary income effect 
of the rise in food commodity prices on household expenditures. In this 
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section, we pursue a tentative attempt at better understanding the mecha­
nisms and interpreting the magnitudes of these effects.34
To do this, we extend the VAR analysis of section I along two dimen­
sions. First, we compare the dynamic effects of food supply shocks with 
the effects of crude oil supply shocks identified within the same VAR 
model. The macroeconomic effects of oil supply shocks can serve as a 
benchmark, because several studies have documented that oil and energy 
shocks also have an influence on the U.S. economy that is disproportion­
ately large compared with its share in GDP and consumer expenditures. For 
example, Edelstein and Kilian (2009) find that the response of total con­
sumption to an energy price shock is approximately four times larger than 
the maximum reduction in discretionary income associated with the shift 
in energy prices. We identify oil supply shocks by imposing theoretically 
plau sible sign restrictions on the impulse responses, as proposed by Peersman 
and Ine Van Robays (2009) and by Baumeister and Peersman (2013a). Spe­
cifically, unfavorable oil supply shocks are identified as innovations that 
are orthogonal to the identified food commodity supply shocks and are 
characterized by a decline in global oil production and a rise in the real 
price of oil, while world economic activity does not expand.35 Second, we 
reestimate the VAR by adding an additional variable of interest each time. 
We consider a set of price variables to investigate the pass­through to con­
sumer prices, and we examine the effects on several components of real 
GDP and household expenditures to learn more about the output effects.
34. To interpret the magnitudes, we conduct a number of back­of­the­envelope calcu­
lations, in particular to assess the role of monetary policy. Given the simplicity of the exer­
cise and uncertainty about the exact values of several parameters, these calculations should 
be taken with a grain of salt and interpreted with more than the usual degree of caution.
35. Since the sign restrictions are based on competitive market forces and the oil price 
was regulated before 1974, the results for oil supply shocks are based on VARs that have 
been estimated over the sample period 1974:Q1–2013:Q4. As an alternative approach, Kilian 
(2009) uses (zero) exclusion restrictions to identify oil supply shocks in a monthly VAR that 
includes global oil production, a measure of economic activity, and the real price of crude oil. 
In particular, he assumes that the short­run oil supply curve is vertical, implying that global oil 
production does not respond to all other (oil demand) shocks in the VAR instantaneously. This 
assumption might be plausible at the monthly frequency but is not appropriate when quarterly 
data are used. Notice also that we rely on a uniform Haar prior distribution to implement the 
sign restrictions. Baumeister and Hamilton (2015) show that this could imply nonuniform dis­
tributions for key objects of interest and that Bayesian inference with informative priors can 
be an improvement. Although this is a promising avenue, this approach is beyond the scope 
of this paper given that the identification of oil supply shocks is not the focus of this study.
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IV.A. Comparison with Oil Shocks
Figure 13 compares the impulse responses of the benchmark variables 
to a commodity supply shock of 1 standard deviation for crude oil and 
food. Some interesting facts are worth mentioning. First, an oil supply 
shock of 1 standard deviation corresponds to a rise in real crude oil prices 
of 4.9 percent on impact, which reaches a peak of 5.6 percent after one 
quarter, and gradually returns to the baseline after four quarters. The pat­
tern of oil prices after an oil supply shock is very similar to the pattern of 
food commodity prices after a food supply shock, although the magnitude 
is approximately three times larger. Second, with a peak effect of -0.39, the 
consequences of an oil supply shock of 1 standard deviation for real GDP 
are approximately 1.5 times stronger. Put differently, the impact of a rise in 
real food commodity prices on economic activity is roughly twice as large 
as the impact of a rise in crude oil prices of equal size. Third, the dynamic 
effects of both shocks on real personal consumption are more or less the 
same, whereas an average food commodity supply shock has a slightly 
stronger and more persistent impact on consumer prices than an average oil 
supply shock. Finally, oil supply shocks reduce global economic activity 
for a period of two years, have no significant effects on global food produc­
tion and food commodity prices, and have a negative impact on the federal 
funds rate.
A noteworthy difference between both shocks is the monetary policy 
response; that is, the federal funds rate increases by 8 basis points after 
a food commodity market shock, whereas the policy rate decreases by 
11 basis points on impact, and by 20 basis points after one quarter in 
response to an oil supply shock. In other words, monetary policy seems to 
amplify the consequences of food market disruptions for economic activity, 
while partly stabilizing the real effects of oil supply shocks. This is rel­
evant for interpreting the magnitudes of the indirect effects of both shocks. 
Specifically, a reasonable rule of thumb for monetary policy effects is that 
a rise in the federal funds rate of 10 basis points leads to a decline in real 
GDP of between 0.05 and 0.1 percent.36 If we take these values seriously, 
this implies that the contemporaneous monetary policy response to food 
36. Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1999) find that an interest rate innovation of 
60 basis points reduces real GDP by 0.5 percent. Bernanke and Mihov (1998) find that a 
monetary policy shock that raises the federal funds rate by 0.4 percent leads to a decline of 
real GDP by 0.3 percent. When we also identify a monetary policy shock within the bench­
mark VAR model (by ordering the federal funds rate last in the Cholesky decomposition), 
as discussed in subsection IV.B, we find that a 60 basis points rise in the federal funds rate 
leads to a fall in real GDP and personal consumption by approximately 0.4 percent.
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Figure 13. Comparing Food Supply and Oil Supply Shocksa
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market disturbances can potentially explain almost one­third of the output 
effects, while the remaining effects on personal consumption are still at 
least four times the discretionary loss in purchasing power. In contrast, 
a similar immediate response to oil supply shocks would have resulted 
in much stronger output effects of such shocks. If Edelstein and Kilian’s 
(2009) results are representative for oil supply shocks—that is, they find 
that the impact of an energy price shock on total consumption is approxi­
mately four times larger than the maximum reduction in discretionary 
income—this also implies that the magnitudes of the indirect (non monetary 
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a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks (same as in figure 6); the dashed and dotted lines are 
the results of the oil supply shocks. 
Figure 13. Comparing Food Supply and Oil Supply Shocksa (Continued )
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37. In contrast to food commodities, which are only an input factor in the food process­
ing sector (except biofuels in recent periods), it is very difficult to calculate the exact share 
of crude oil in household expenditures because oil is an input factor that is used for several 
product categories (as well as investment goods and government purchases). If we only con­
sider the direct share of heating oil and motor fuel in household expenditures, and take into 
account that about half of gasoline prices is determined by the cost of crude oil, the effects of 
oil supply shocks on real GDP obtained with the VAR model are also roughly four times the 
discretionary loss in purchasing power.
policy) effects of food commodity and oil supply shocks on consumption 
are probably in the same neighborhood.37
IV.B. Consumer Prices
The CPI is calculated as a weighted average of prices of different types 
of goods and services, which can be divided into food (17 percent), energy 
(6 percent), and core (77 percent) CPI. A rise in food commodity prices can 
affect these components via several channels. First, there is a direct effect 
on the CPI’s food component. The exact pass­through of food commodity 
prices to final prices of food products should depend on competition and 
demand conditions in the food sector. Second, a rise in food commodity 
prices may augment energy prices, because food commodities are also used 
for the production of biofuels—from home heating to vehicle fuels, which 
are a source of energy. Third, if energy prices rise, production costs for firms 
could also rise. If firms pass these costs through to their selling prices, the 
consumer prices of nonenergy goods may also rise. Finally, higher inflation 
or inflation expectations could trigger so­called second­round effects that 
could greatly amplify and protract the effects of the shock on core inflation. 
For example, employees could demand higher nominal wages in subsequent 
wage­bargaining rounds in order to maintain their purchasing power, lead­
ing to mutually reinforcing feedback effects between wages and prices. 
Similar channels have been documented for oil shocks.
The impulse responses of food, energy, and core CPI are depicted in 
figure 14. Not surprisingly, a rise in food commodity prices has a strong 
and significant effect on CPI food, with a peak of 0.27 percent after four 
quarters. Given a share of food commodities in final food products and 
beverages of approximately 14 percent and a rise of nominal food com­
modity prices of 1.8 percent, this implies that changes in food commod­
ity prices are more or less fully passed through to food consumer prices. 
Furthermore, the effects of food commodity market disturbances on CPI 
energy are positive, but are not statistically significant at the 10 percent 
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Figure 14. The Pass-Through to Consumer Pricesa
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level. Notice, however, that the insignificant impact is misleading because 
it ignores time variation. The use of biofuels as a source of energy is only 
a recent phenomenon. As was shown in subsection II.D (figure 11), the 
impact of food commodity market shocks on CPI energy was insignificant 
before 2003. Conversely, food market shocks seem to have had a signifi­
cant and strong impact on CPI energy since 2003, in line with the rising 
share of biofuels in petroleum consumption. Because the latter period is 
more representative of the current situation, we conclude that fluctuations 
in food commodity prices likely also affect consumer prices via energy 
Nominal wages Real consumer wages
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks; the dashed and dotted lines are the results of the oil 
supply shocks. 
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prices.38 Finally, there is a significant rise of core CPI after an unfavorable 
food market disturbance, which reaches a peak of 0.14 percent after seven 
quarters. Given the share of core CPI in the overall CPI, this accounts for 
about two­thirds of total inflationary consequences. The rise in core infla­
tion is hence the reason why the ultimate impact on consumer prices is 
considerably larger than the effects implied by the share of food commodi­
ties in the CPI.39
The pass­through of oil supply shocks to consumer prices turns out to 
be very different. As observed in figure 14, unfavorable oil supply shocks 
augment CPI energy but do not raise food consumer prices. There is even 
a decline of CPI food at longer horizons, and core inflation also does not 
increase. An interesting difference between both types of shocks is that oil 
supply shocks seem to trigger inflationary effects via a rise in import prices 
and a depreciation of the U.S. dollar exchange rate, while food commodity 
supply shocks increase the domestic GDP deflator significantly. In addi­
tion, despite the decline in economic activity, nominal wages remain more 
or less constant after a food market disturbance. In contrast, nominal wages 
decrease significantly after an oil supply shock. Additionally, real consumer 
wages decline immediately after oil supply shocks, whereas the response is 
much stickier after food market shocks.
Overall, these different patterns indicate that second­round effects are a 
key explanation for the stronger pass­through of food commodity supply 
shocks to consumer prices compared with oil supply shocks. This hypoth­
esis is confirmed by the impulse responses of inflation expectations shown 
in figure 14. We observe a persistent and significant rise in inflation expec­
tations after a food supply shock, while the impact of oil supply shocks is 
very short­lived and statistically insignificant. Higher inflation expecta­
tions are typically passed through to actual pricing behavior, in particular 
to the prices of nonfood and nonenergy goods and services. Furthermore, 
higher inflation expectations augment the demand for nominal wages in 
the wage­bargaining process, which further increases firms’ costs and 
the prices of nonfood and nonenergy goods and services. The presence 
38. Notice also that the error bands of the effects on CPI energy in figure 14 are relatively 
large, while the magnitudes of the effects are quite strong, that is, CPI energy increases 
by 0.31 percent on impact and 0.37 percent at its peak. In contrast, when we reestimate 
the VAR over a sample period that ends in 2002:Q4, the effects on CPI energy are essen­
tially zero. The difference between the point estimates also suggests that the pass­through to 
energy prices has become an important channel in recent periods.
39. Notice that core CPI also increases when we estimate VAR models over more recent 
sample periods, for example, excluding the Great Inflation. Second­round effects of food 
market shocks are thus still important and have not vanished over time.
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of second­round effects and the greater impact of food market disrup­
tions on inflation expectations and core inflation probably also explain 
the Federal Reserve’s tightening of monetary policy after such shocks, 
in contrast to a policy easing following oil supply shocks.40
IV.C. Household Expenditures and Economic Activity
Because food is a basic necessity, food demand is considered to be quite 
inelastic. Unless households increase borrowing, higher food prices conse­
quently erode the disposable income to purchase other goods and services, 
leading to a decline in expenditures. In subsection II.C, we argued that the 
upper bound of such a discretionary income effect is 0.04 to 0.05 percent, 
while personal consumption declines by almost 0.3 percent after a food 
commodity supply shock of 1 standard deviation. Hence, other propagation 
mechanisms should also be at play. A first plausible channel is the mon­
etary policy response to control inflation, which curtails aggregate demand. 
However, as discussed in subsection IV.A, the monetary policy response 
can at most explain one­third of the overall effects.
Besides the monetary policy effects, how are food commodity market 
disruptions transmitted to the real economy? There are several reasons to 
believe that the underlying mechanisms are similar to the pass­through of 
oil supply shocks to economic activity. First, as argued in subsection IV.A, 
the magnitudes of the indirect (nonmonetary policy) effects of both shocks 
are within the same neighborhood. Most important, the dynamic effects of 
both shocks on the components of household expenditures are also very 
much alike. This can be observed in figure 15, which shows the effects of 
food commodity and crude oil supply shocks on several components of 
household expenditures and investment. Not surprisingly, unfavorable 
food supply shocks have a significant negative impact on nondurable food 
consumption—that is, food and beverages for off­premises consumption— 
while oil supply shocks reduce the consumption of energy goods and ser­
vices, not the other way around.41 However, all other impulse responses 
40. The finding that inflation expectations (and core inflation) respond more to food 
prices than energy prices has also been documented by Clark and Davig (2008), among 
others. Several studies also find that economic agents weigh food prices considerably higher 
than its share in expenditures when forming inflation expectations, in contrast to energy 
prices (Murphy and Rohde 2015). A possible explanation why food prices have larger effects 
on inflation expectations and core inflation is that energy prices are substantially more vola­
tile than food prices.
41. The demand for food and energy products is hence not completely inelastic to shifts 
in their own prices. In contrast, the impact of food commodity shocks on the consumption 
of food services and accommodations turns out to be insignificant at the 10 percent level.
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Figure 15. The Pass-Through to Household Expendituresa
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behave qualitatively and quantitatively similarly. Strikingly, this is even the 
case for the consumption of motor vehicles and parts, a subcomponent 
of durable consumption that is typically considered to be complementary 
in use with oil, and thus is perceived as being much more sensitive to oil 
shocks relative to other shocks. Overall, these findings suggest that the 
dominant mechanisms that lead to a decline in a household’s purchases of 
nonfood and nonenergy nondurables and services, and also purchases of 
durable consumption goods, are quite similar.
The impulse responses further reveal that a crucial channel whereby 
food commodity market shocks (and oil supply shocks) affect the economy 
Exports Motor vehicles and parts (durables)
Consumer sentiment
4 8 12 4 8 12
4 8 12
Percent
–1.5
–0.5
–1
0.5
–1
–0.5
0
0
–1.5
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Source: Authors’ calculations.  
a. The range shown around estimates are the 16th and 84th percentile error bands. The solid line and shaded 
area are the results of the food commodity supply shocks; the dashed and dotted lines are the results of the oil 
supply shocks. 
Figure 15. The Pass-Through to Household Expendituresa (Continued )
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is a shift in the consumption of durables and investment. Specifically, dura­
ble consumption decreases by 0.93 percent after a food market disruption, 
which is three times more than the overall decline in personal consumption. 
Likewise, there is a reduction in investment of 0.93 percent. The relevance 
of both output components for explaining the consequences of food market 
disruptions is illustrated in table 2. The table’s first two columns show the 
maximum effects of both shocks on all the components of figure 15, while 
the third and fourth columns list the relative responses of the components 
to the response of total personal consumption. The fifth and sixth columns 
show the weighted effects of the components, with the weights calcu­
lated as the ratio of each component to GDP. As observed, durables and 
investment are considerably more sensitive to food supply shocks than 
other components of household expenditures, followed by nondurable 
food consumption. In addition, despite their limited weights, both com­
ponents account for the bulk of the output effects.42
One argument that could be made against our reasoning is that the stron­
ger effects of food market shocks on the consumption of durables and 
investment are driven by the monetary policy response rather than other 
mechanisms, because both aggregates are typically much more sensitive to 
interest rate changes. Though this is true, we believe that it does not change 
our conclusion. To illustrate this, we identify a monetary policy shock 
within the VAR model.43 The maximum effects of a shift in the federal 
funds rate of 8 basis points—that is, the estimated contemporaneous mon­
etary policy response to a food commodity supply shock—on all compo­
nents are reported in the last column of table 2. Durable consumption and 
investment indeed react much more to a monetary policy shock than the 
other components. However, the magnitudes are too small to account for 
the stronger responses to food commodity supply shocks depicted in the 
table’s first two columns. Even in the absence of monetary policy tighten­
ing, the effects on durables and investment are still a multiple of the effects 
on the other expenditures’ components. Hence, the greater impact on dura­
ble consumption and investment compared with other categories of goods 
42. There is also a decline in the volume of exports of 0.37 percent after a food commod­
ity supply shock. The contribution to the overall output effects, however, is relatively low. 
The export effects are also statistically insignificant at the 10 percent level. For oil supply 
shocks, in contrast, there is a strong and significant decline in exports that matters for the 
overall output effects.
43. For simplicity, we use Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans’s (1999) identification 
strategy by ordering the federal funds rate last in the Cholesky decomposition. Other 
approaches typically find similar output effects. One caveat is that we obtain a so­called 
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and services can only partly be explained by the monetary policy tighten­
ing, and thus other effects on both aggregates are crucial in explaining the 
consequences of food market shocks.
IV.D.  Potential Explanations for Magnitude  
and Composition of Output Effects
The remaining question is which nonmonetary policy mechanisms could 
magnify the consequences of both shocks for personal consumption. In 
spite of the voluminous literature on the effects of oil price shocks, there is 
little consensus on the dominant mechanism. Popular channels that have 
been put forward in the oil and energy literature are the postponement of 
irreversible purchases of investment and durable consumption goods 
because of increased uncertainty about future energy prices and a shift in 
the consumption of durables that are complementary in use with energy 
(Edelstein and Kilian 2009; Hamilton 2008). However, it is not likely that 
the postponement of irreversible purchases applies to food prices. Further­
more, because the purchases of motor vehicles react in a similar way to 
food and oil shocks, complementary effects also cannot be dominant.44
There are, however, various other channels that have been documented 
for oil and energy price shocks, which could also apply to food commod­
ity price shocks. For example, Julio Rotemberg and Michael Woodford 
(1996) demonstrate that imperfect competition considerably amplifies the 
effects of shocks on factor prices. With a calibrated, one­sector stochastic 
growth model with energy input, they show that allowing for a modest 
degree of imperfect competition increases the predicted effects of a rise 
in energy prices on economic activity by a factor of five, and that such 
market imperfections can account for their estimates of the consequences 
for U.S. output. Mary Finn (2000) shows that variable capital utilization 
also greatly intensifies the repercussions of shifts in factor prices for the 
real economy, even in perfectly competitive markets, and can explain the 
magnitudes found in the empirical literature. Given the critical role of food 
commodities as an input factor in the food­processing sector, these theories 
could also apply to food commodity price shocks.
Another class of models in the oil literature focuses on frictions in real­
locating capital and labor across sectors that may be differently influenced 
by oil price shifts (Davis and Haltiwanger 2001; Hamilton 1988). Such 
frictions lead to higher unemployment and lower capacity utilization in 
44. The only possible exception for both arguments is the role of food commodities to 
produce energy goods in recent periods, but this cannot be the case for the average effects 
since the 1960s.
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affected sectors that can magnify the effects on economic activity.45 A pop­
ular example in the oil literature is a reallocation of capital and labor away 
from the automobile sector when consumers purchase fewer cars, or a real­
location of resources within the automobile sector when consumers switch 
toward more energy­efficient cars in response to oil price hikes. However, 
food market shocks could also lead to a changed composition of aggregate 
demand, which could result in a costly reallocation of capital and labor 
across sectors that would reduce economic activity. For example, there 
could be substitution between the use of food services and accommoda­
tions to purchases of food and beverages for off­premises consumption. 
Most important, the results given in figure 15 show that food price shocks 
lead to a considerably greater decline in expenditures on durable goods 
compared with nondurables and services, which could trigger sectoral 
shifts throughout the economy that further amplify the macro economic 
consequences.46
In fact, a stronger response of durable consumption to shocks in house­
holds’ purchasing power, and possible reallocation effects that protract the 
macroeconomic consequences, may be a plausible mechanism to explain 
our empirical results—both the amplification and composition of the out­
put effects—as well as the similarity to the dynamics of oil shocks. Specifi­
cally, consumer theory shows that expenditures on luxuries and durables 
should be more sensitive to transitory income shocks than expenditures on 
necessities and nondurables. For example, Martin Browning and Thomas 
Crossley (2009) demonstrate that households can significantly reduce their 
total expenditures without a significant decline in welfare if they con­
centrate their budget reductions on durables. The reason is that a sub­
stantial reduction in expenditures on durables can be realized with only a 
modest decline in the consumption of durables because existing stocks of 
durables could continue to provide a flow of services.47 Such a mechanism 
45. These additional effects can be very large. For example, Acemoglu, Akcigit, and 
Kerr (2016) show that small shocks can cause sizable aggregate fluctuations due to their 
propagation through the production network.
46. Notice that the presence of significant reallocation effects implies that the conse­
quences of food price increases for household expenditures should be stronger than food 
price decreases because such effects amplify the former, while dampening the latter. As 
mentioned in footnote 28, we find support for this prediction in the data.
47. Hamermesh (1982), Parker (1999), and Browning and Crossley (2000) also discuss 
mechanisms for how transitory changes in income could have a disproportionately greater 
effect on expenditures of luxuries and durables. Bils and Klenow (1998) confirm this pre­
diction in U.S. data for 57 types of consumer goods. Dynarski and Gruber (1997) find that 
the elasticity of durables to changes in income in the United States is eight times larger than 
for nondurables.
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can explain why purchases of motor vehicles respond considerably more 
strongly than several other goods and services to both food price and 
oil price shocks, without the requirement of being complementary in 
use. In essence, when food and energy bills increase, households can 
continue to drive their existing car for a while, rather than buying a new 
car. Although the welfare losses from this behavior might be small at 
the individual household level, the macroeconomic accelerator effects 
may be substantial.
Notice that this accelerator mechanism may be particularly important 
for food and energy price shocks, because the share of food and energy 
consumption in household expenditures is substantially higher for low­
income households. For example, according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure Survey, the share of food and bever­
ages consumption in total expenditures of the lowest income quintile was 
16.2 percent in 2014, compared with only 12.1 percent for the highest 
quintile. For energy expenditures (natural gas, electricity, fuel oil, other 
fuels, gasoline, and motor fuels), the shares are 10.7 and 6.4 percent, 
respectively, for the lowest and highest quintiles. Measured as a percent­
age of total income after taxes, the differences are even more dramatic: 
35.8 and 9.1 percent for food consumption, and 23.6 and 4.8 percent for 
energy consumption. Because food and energy are basic necessities, and 
low­income households typically also have borrowing constraints and no 
liquid assets to smooth consumption over time, they thus have few other 
options than reducing expenditures on durables.
Finally, when food prices increase, households may decide to con­
sume less and to increase their precautionary savings because of a rise 
in uncertainty or a greater perceived likelihood of future unemployment 
and income loss. According to John Cochrane (2016), precautionary sav­
ings and risk aversion are prominent ingredients of business cycle fluc­
tuations. In particular, he argues that higher risk premiums and increases 
in risk aversion triggered by relatively small shocks affecting consumers, 
rather than risk­free rates and intertemporal substitution, are the central fea­
tures of recessions. Edelstein and Kilian (2009) provide empirical evidence 
that shifts in precautionary savings and deteriorating consumer confidence 
are likely an important determinant of the excess response of household 
consumption to energy price shocks.
To assess the possibility of precautionary savings effects, the final panel 
of figure 15 shows the impulse responses of the University of Michigan’s 
Index of Consumer Sentiment to food commodity and crude oil supply 
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shocks. As can be observed, there is a significant decline in consumer sen­
timent after both shocks, which is consistent with increased uncertainty by 
households. Precautionary savings effects may thus also be an important 
propagation mechanism of food market disruptions to the real economy. 
Whether this is indeed the case, and the relevance of the different mecha­
nisms to explain the overall effects, are questions that cannot be answered 
with the methods used in this paper. This requires other methods, such as 
general equilibrium models that incorporate food markets, and is left for 
future research.
V. Conclusions
Food commodity markets have historically been subject to considerable 
volatility. In particular, since the start of the millennium, there have 
been large swings in global food commodity prices. Although the linkages 
between food commodity market fluctuations and the macroeconomy are 
important for designing policies that can ameliorate the consequences of 
these swings, these linkages are poorly understood. With global tempera­
tures expected to rise substantially during the next decades, understanding 
these relationships will become even more important. In this paper, we have 
estimated the consequences of disruptions in global food commodity mar­
kets for the U.S. economy during the past 50 years. Because food markets 
also respond to developments in the macroeconomy, the main challenge 
in doing this is to identify exogenous shifts in food commodity prices. We 
have used two different approaches for identifying such movements. The 
first strategy is a joint structural VAR model for global food commodity 
markets and the U.S. economy, in which food market disruptions are iden­
tified as unanticipated changes in a quarterly global food production index 
that we have constructed based on the planting and harvesting calendars 
of the four major staples—corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. As our sec­
ond, alternative identification strategy, we relied on narratives—from FAO 
reports, newspaper articles, disaster databases, and several other sources—
to identify 13 historical episodes when significant changes in food com­
modity prices were mainly caused by exogenous food market events.
The structural VAR analysis and the narrative approach lead to similar 
conclusions. We find a considerable impact of fluctuations in food com­
modity markets on the U.S. economy. On one hand, a rise in food com­
modity prices augments food and core consumer prices, as well as energy 
prices more recently. On the other hand, there is a persistent decline in real 
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GDP and household expenditures. The effects are approximately four to 
six times larger than the maximum impact implied by the share of food 
commodities in the CPI and household consumption. An intriguing find­
ing is that households reduce durable consumption much more than food 
consumption. Additionally, investment declines considerably. Both effects 
can only partly be explained by a moderate tightening of monetary policy 
in order to stabilize the shocks’ inflationary consequences. A better under­
standing of these indirect effects’ exact mechanisms remains complex and 
is an interesting topic for future research. The construction of dynamic 
general equilibrium models for food markets may be useful to answer this 
question. Other avenues for future research are analyses of cross­country 
differences and consideration of the question of whether policies, such as 
public food security programs or monetary policy, could dampen the macro­ 
economic consequences of food market disruptions.
A P P E N D I X
Example of a Narratively Identified Global Food Commodity 
Market Shock: Droughts around the Globe in 2012:Q3
Type of shock: Unfavorable.
Food commodity market event:
Due to droughts in Russia, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the United States, there 
was a significant decline in global cereal production. In retrospect, annual 
global cereal production contracted by 2.4 percent. In July 2012, the USDA 
decreased its June estimate for U.S. corn by 12 percent because of the worst 
midwestern drought in a quarter century. Heat waves in southern Europe 
added serious concern about global food supplies later that month, as well as 
below­average rainfall in Australia. In August, there was news about a late 
monsoon negatively affecting the rice harvest in Asia. According to the Inter­
national Food Policy Research Institute, production of food grains in south­
ern Asia was expected to decline by 12 percent compared with a year earlier. 
Also in August, the Russian grain harvest forecasts were reduced because 
of a drought. In October 2012, wheat output in Russia was estimated to be 
about 30 percent down from 2011; in Ukraine, a decrease of about 33 per­
cent was expected; and in Kazakhstan, output was reported to be just half 
of the previous year’s good level. The wheat harvest indeed declined in 
2012, by 33 percent, 29 percent, and 57 percent in Russia, Ukraine, and 
Kazakhstan, respectively. The EM­DAT database of international disas­
ters lists droughts in Ukraine (April 15, 2012 to July 31, 2012), Russia 
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(June 2012 to September 2012), and the United States (June 2012 to 
December 2012).
We allocate the shock to 2012:Q3 because this is the period when the 
severe scaling back of the expected harvests started, resulting in consider­
able price increases. Real food commodity prices increased by 7.9 percent 
in that quarter, whereas oil prices decreased by 1.6 percent. The same com­
ment about the Greek debt crisis reported for the 2010:Q3 shock applies for 
2012:Q3 (the Second Economic Adjustment Programme for Greece was 
approved in March 2012). There were no other events that could explain 
the rise in food commodity prices.
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The worst Midwest drought in a quarter century is doing more damage to U.S. 
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drought already drove prices to a record.
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The heat wave in Europe is adding to concern about global food supplies as 
U.S. farmers face the worst drought since 1956, India delays sowing because of a 
late monsoon and Australian crops endure below-average rainfall. Soybeans and 
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The United Nations says food prices will probably rebound after falling the most 
in three years in the second quarter.
256 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Fall 2016
Prabhudatta Mishra, “Rice Harvest in India Set to Drop as Drought Curbs 
Sowing,” Bloomberg (August 16, 2012).
Rice production in India, the world’s second­biggest grower, is poised to slump 
from a record as the worst monsoon since 2009 reduces planting, potentially 
lowering exports and boosting global prices.
The monsoon­sown harvest may be between 5 million metric tons and 
7 million tons below a record 91.5 million tons a year earlier, said P. K. Joshi, 
director for the South Asia region at the Washington­based International Food 
Policy Research Institute. Production of food grains, including corn and len-
tils, may slide as much as 12 percent from 129.9 million tons a year earlier, 
he said.
Rice has rallied 6.3 percent in Chicago since the end of May on prospects for 
a lower Indian crop and export curbs, adding to global food costs that the United 
Nations estimates jumped 6.2 percent in July. Corn and soybeans have soared 
to records as the worst U.S. drought in half a century killed crops. Global rice 
production this year will be smaller than previously forecast, according to the 
UN’s Food & Agriculture Organization.
Polina Devitt, “Russia Harvest Forecasts Cut as Drought Hits Crop in 
East,” Reuters (August 20, 2012).
Two leading Russian agricultural analysts cut their forecasts for Russia’s grain 
harvest on Monday after harvest data from two drought­stricken eastern growing 
regions reduced the outlook for the overall crop. SovEcon narrowed their grain 
forecast to 71–72.5 million metric tons (78.3–79.9 million tons) from a previous 
70–74 million tonnes after the start of harvesting campaign in Urals and Siberia 
regions showed weak crop prospects. It has also cut wheat harvest forecast to 
39–41 million tonnes from earlier 40.5–42.5 million tonnes.
The Institute for Agricultural Market Studies (IKAR) has cut its 2012 grain 
crop forecast to 73 million tonnes from a previously expected 75.4 million 
tonnes, its chief executive, Dmitry Rylko, said. It has not yet estimated wheat 
harvest.
“I see the possibility of further downgrading,” Rylko said.
Global Information and Early Warning System, “Crop Prospects and Food 
Situation,” no. 3 (October 2012), Rome: United Nations, Food and Agri­
cultural Organization.
FAO’s latest forecast for world cereal production in 2012 has been revised down-
ward slightly (0.4 percent) since the previous update in September, to 2,286 mil­
lion tonnes. The latest adjustment mostly reflects a smaller maize crop in central 
and southeastern parts of Europe, where yields are turning out lower than earlier 
expectations following prolonged dry conditions. At the current forecast level, 
world cereal production in 2012 would be 2.6 percent down from the previous 
year’s record crop but close to the second largest in 2008. The overall decrease 
comprises a 5.2 percent reduction in wheat production, and a 2.3 percent reduction  
for coarse grains, while the global rice crop is seen to remain virtually unchanged. 
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Severe droughts this year in the United States and across a large part of Europe 
and into central Asia have been the main cause of the reduced wheat and coarse 
grains crops. . . .
FAO’s latest forecast for global wheat production in 2012 stands at 663 mil­
lion tonnes, 5.2 percent below last year’s level, but close to the average of the 
past five years. This level is considerably below expectations earlier in the 
year, largely reflecting the impact of the severe drought that set­in across east­
ern Europe and central Asia, but also on account of downward revisions for 
the key Southern Hemisphere producing countries where weather and policy 
factors in some cases have reduced prospects for the 2012 crop yet to be 
harvested.
Most of the decline in global wheat production, compared to last year, reflects 
the negative effects of drought in the major producing CIS countries in Europe 
and Asia. Wheat output in the Russian Federation is estimated some 30 percent 
down from 2011, in Ukraine, latest information points to a decrease of about 
33 percent, while in Kazakhstan, output is reported to be just half of last year’s 
good level. In other parts of Europe, wheat output also declined, particularly 
in some central and southeastern countries on the edge of the drought­affected 
zone. The aggregate output of the EU countries is estimated to be down by 
2.6 percent. In the other Asian subregions, record crops have been gathered in 
the key producers in the Far East, namely, China and India, while in the Near 
East, results have been mixed: good crops were gathered in Afghanistan and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran but outputs were down elsewhere, reflecting dry 
conditions and/or the negative impact of civil disturbances. The 2012 harvest 
results were also mixed in North Africa, where production recovered in Algeria 
but was sharply reduced in Morocco due to dry conditions. In the United States, 
this year’s wheat production is estimated to have increased by 13.4 percent to an 
above­average level of 61.7 million tonnes. In Canada, output is expected to be 
above average and almost 7 percent higher than in 2011.
In South America, the subregion’s aggregate wheat production is forecast at 
about 21 million tonnes, 12 percent down from the previous year and below 
average. The expected reduction reflects a general decline in the area planted in 
response to changes in marketing policy and due to dry weather at sowing time 
in June and July. In Oceania, prospects for the wheat crop in Australia are mixed, 
reflecting varied winter rainfall and moisture conditions: overall output is fore­
cast down by about 24 percent from last year’s record crop due to lower yields 
expected in some major producing areas affected by dry conditions.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
WOLFRAM SCHLENKER  This paper by Jasmien De Winne and Gert 
Peersman presents an innovative analysis of whether food commodity price 
shocks have ramifications throughout the larger economy. There is a large 
body of literature discussing how oil price fluctuations might have an impact 
on the economy, yet very little work has been done examining the effects of 
food commodity price fluctuations.
The authors address this question in two ways: empirically, by estimat-
ing a vector autoregression (VAR) model; and narratively, by examining 
the economic response to 13 episodes of significant commodity market 
surprises. The VAR cleverly extends a previous analysis that used annual 
commodity yield shocks of the four staple commodities—corn, wheat, rice, 
and soybeans—as instruments for commodity prices. The authors utilize 
calendars for the various crops to define the quarters for which produc-
tion shocks should show up as news. The analysis concentrates on crops 
and countries where the harvest time falls in a different quarter than the 
planting time. Farmers endogenously choose how much to plant; but, con-
ditional on the planted area, production shocks at harvest time are pre-
dominantly exogenously determined by the effect of weather on yields. The 
authors find a large effect of commodity price shocks on U.S. GDP. There 
is even a surprisingly large positive effect on durables like cars.
The VAR is discussed in more detail in Mark Watson’s comment. Here, 
I focus on a puzzle in the mechanism behind the discovered relationship 
and a reduced-form sensitivity check.
COMMODITY PRICES VERSUS FOOD PRICES When talking about prices, it is 
important to separate the raw commodity prices that farmers receive for their 
products from the food prices that consumers pay at the store. Though the 
latter accounted for, on average, 17 percent of households’ expenditures in 
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the 1960–2015 period, the fraction that falls on the pure commodity cost is 
rather minor. Michael Roberts and I (2013) estimate that for a 2,000-calorie 
daily diet of raw, unprocessed rice, the annual commodity cost fell in real 
terms during the 20th century, and is currently less than $100. Because 
nobody eats raw, unprocessed rice and nothing else, this is of course a 
hypothetical example. A meat-based diet would have higher commodity 
costs; 1 calorie of meat requires more than 1 calorie of feedstock, as a large 
fraction of the feedstock is used to sustain the animal. But the largest com-
ponent of the final food price consumers end up paying at the store is the 
processing and distribution cost. There is a big difference between changes 
in the price of raw commodities—which can easily double in response to 
production shocks due to the inelastic demand for commodities—and the 
change in food prices at the supermarket.
This point has been made by Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian 
(2014), who show that fluctuations in oil prices do not translate into changes 
in the food prices consumers pay at the store. They emphasize,
The distinction between retail food prices and the prices received by farmers 
for grain crops and livestock is important. . . . The discrepancy between the 
slow growth in real consumer food prices and the more rapid growth in the crop 
prices received by farmers is explained by the small cost share of agricultural 
products in the food prices paid by U.S. consumers. For example, the farm value 
of wheat in the price of bread is only about 5 percent, so even substantial wheat 
price increases are associated with only small increases in the price of bread. 
(Baumeister and Kilian 2014, p. 736)
This raises a question about the possible mechanism between commodity 
prices that farmers receive and overall economic fluctuations in the United 
States: Are the observed commodity price swings large enough to change 
how much consumers pay at the store? If not, how would higher com-
modity prices affect consumer spending, and possibly make an impact on 
the larger economy?
My figure 1 plots the quarterly commodity price index for both the large 
basket of commodities and the narrower cereal price index from De Winne 
and Peersman for the years 1996–2015. The dashed lines show the large 
rise between 2005 and 2008, especially for the cereal index, where prices 
roughly tripled. The figure also shows food expenditures taken from the 
diary files of the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Consumer Expenditure 
Survey. Weekly expenditures are aggregated to the quarterly level to match 
De Winne and Peersman’s time scale, and are then multiplied by four to 
get the corresponding annual cost in nominal dollars, as shown on the right 
vertical axis. The solid black line shows total expenditures, which increase 
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smoothly over time, from roughly $4,500 in 1996 to $6,500 in 2015. The 
solid gray lines separate total expenditures into ones for food consumed at 
home and in restaurants. These lines rise smoothly over time as well.
The disconnect between commodity prices and food expenditures 
is apparent. The former roughly tripled, yet the latter hardly budged at 
all. There might be differences between farmers’ commodity prices and 
consumers’ food expenditures. Stores might choose not to pass on all fluc-
tuations. Alternatively, an increase in prices might be offset by a decrease 
in the quantity consumed, though the complete unresponsiveness in expen-
ditures when commodity prices triple seems odd, given the highly inelastic 
demand. For comparison, my figure 2 plots prices for eggs and milk as well 
as food expenditures from the diary files from the Consumer Expenditure 
Survey. Both eggs and milk are much harder to store than raw commodi-
ties, so farmer prices fluctuate more wildly because shocks cannot be 
smoothed across time; yet, the two series of farmer prices and store prices 
appear to be very much linked.
The most likely reason why consumers’ food expenditures do not respond 
to farmers’ commodity prices for the four basic staples—corn, wheat, rice, 
50
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Sources: De Winne and Peersman; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey.
a. The values are indexed so that the average nominal food price equals 100. 
b. Weekly nominal food expenditures are aggregated to the quarterly level, and are multiplied by 4 to give the 
annual cost. 
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Total food consumed 
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Figure 1. Commodity Prices versus Food Price Expenditures, 1996–2015
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Sources: U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service; U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey. 
a. For food prices, monthly data are averaged over the three months of each quarter; for consumer expendi-
tures, weekly data are aggregated to the quarterly level. 
b. The values are indexed so that the average nominal food price equals 100. 
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Figure 2. Food Prices versus Food Expenditures for Eggs and Milk, 1996–2015a
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and soybeans—is that the latter are a small fraction of the former. If food 
expenditures do not respond to commodity prices, is the observed signifi-
cant relationship between commodity prices and the economy at large real? 
The next section presents an alternative reduced-form sensitivity check.
REDUCED-FORM ANALYSIS USING CALORIC SHOCKS De Winne and Peersman’s 
VAR uses production in the harvest quarter as a variable. Not all changes in 
total production are news, given that some are anticipated and endogenous, 
such as changes in the growing area. This is accounted for in the VAR by 
incorporating commodity prices, which should reflect all information the 
market knew at the time of the harvest. However, the linearity in the VAR 
model might be inadequate to model all nonlinear responses to changes in 
expectations and prices.
An alternative to including total production as a variable is to construct 
shocks that are unexpected news. My figure 3 shows such unexpected quar-
terly caloric shocks, which are constructed as residuals from a regression 
of log yields to country- and crop-specific time trends. They are then 
summed over all countries and crops using predicted production weights 
and the caloric content of each crop. For a detailed description of how 
these shocks are derived, see Roberts and Schlenker (2013, p. 2271). The 
only difference between my figure 3 and Roberts and Schlenker’s (2013) 
methodology is that my shocks are aggregated to the quarterly level, 
whereas Roberts and Schlenker aggregate to the annual level. The harvest 
starts as defined by De Winne and Peersman’s crop calendar. My figure 3 
shows the results when the time trend is modeled as a restricted cubic spline 
with either four or six knots. The number of knots has a negligible effect on 
the shocks, because yields have been trending upward very smoothly over 
time. The shocks (deviations from a country- and crop-specific trend) are 
exogenous and random in time, making them ideal as an instrument.
My table 1 presents the results of a simple reduced-form regression 
when various quarterly dependent variables, yt, are regressed on the caloric 
production shocks that are due to yield anomalies wt (both a contempo-
raneous term and five lags to match the lag structure of De Winne and 
Peersman), quarterly fixed effects aq(t), and a time trend f (t), which is again 
flexibly modeled as a restricted cubic spline with either four or six knots:
∑ ( )= α + β + + ε( ) −
=
y w f tt q t k t k t
k
.
0
5
Various variables used by De Winne and Peersman are used as the 
dependent variable: Columns 1 and 2 use their real commodity price index; 
columns 3 and 4 use the real cereal price index; columns 5 and 6 use real 
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U.S. GDP; and columns 7 and 8 use real global production. The odd-
numbered columns use a restricted cubic spline time trend with four knots, 
while the even-numbered columns use six knots. The top panel estimates 
the model in first differences of the log variables, while the bottom panel 
estimates the model in log levels.
Focus on the differenced results in the top panel: The results for com-
modity price in columns 1 and 2 are highly significant; an unexpected 
caloric shock in production leads to a large, significant change in prices 
of the opposite sign. The large magnitude is due to the extremely inelastic 
demand for the good, and supply usually requires a full year (four quarters) 
to respond during the next annual cropping cycle. The timing also seems 
intuitive; prices move in the two quarters after new production shocks are 
revealed. The second quarter might be an artifact of the classification 
scheme, where harvesting periods that span two quarters are assigned to the 
first. Shocks might not be fully revealed until quarter t + 1. The coefficients 
a year later in quarters t + 4 and t + 5 are significant and of the opposite 
sign, as production shortfalls can be counterbalanced in the next growing 
season by increasing the growing area. The combined effect—the sum of 
Sources: Author’s calculations; Roberts and Schlenker (2013). 
a. This figure shows caloric shocks in the harvesting quarter, following the crop calendar used by De Winne and 
Peersman. The model regresses log yields on time trends for each crop and country, and derives the residuals. 
The log deviations are aggregated over all crops and countries for the harvesting quarter using the predicted 
production (yield trend × actual area), multiplied by a caloric conversion factor as weight. Time trends are 
modeled as restricted cubic splines with four or six knots. 
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Figure 3. Caloric Shocks, 1960–2015a
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the six individual coefficients—is given at the bottom of each panel. They 
are insignificant because temporary price spikes disappear in the next 
growing season, when production responses can take place. My figure 4 
shows that commodity prices move very closely together; the figure 
compares De Winne and Peersman’s price indexes with data for the four 
commodities, corn, wheat, rice, and soybeans. Correlations of the price 
deviations from a time trend are given in my table 2; they are generally 
very high, on average about .80.
Conversely, the results for GDP and global production in the last four 
columns of my table 1 suggest no significant effects of production shocks 
on GDP or global production in any of the following five quarters. The 
combined effect is very small in magnitude and not significantly different 
from 0.
The bottom panel of my table 1 uses levels as a sensitivity check, which 
might be questionable for variables that are not stationary but is shown for 
comparison purposes. Price effects are again significant and of a large mag-
nitude, while the effects on GDP and global production are sometimes sig-
nificant, but can have the opposite sign found by De Winne and Peersman. 
The results are highly sensitive to whether one includes four or six spline 
Sources: De Winne and Peersman; U.S. Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural Statistics Service. 
a. Monthly data are averaged over the three months of each quarter. The values are indexed so that the average 
nominal food price equals 100. 
Nominal food prices indexa
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Figure 4. Comparison of Various Commodity Prices, 1960–2015
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knots. The more flexible specification using six knots gives insignificant 
results or significant results that have a counterintuitive sign.
In summary, the reduced-form regression linking U.S. GDP and global 
production to unexpected food price shocks does not corroborate the find-
ing that food price shocks have an impact on the economy at large. So why 
do the authors find them? One explanation might be that the effects are real 
but small enough that the reduced-form analysis does not pick them up. A 
lack of evidence does not necessarily show the lack of an effect, although 
the standard errors are fairly small.
An alternative explanation might be that instead of food prices affect-
ing GDP, there are omitted confounders. An emerging literature shows 
that weather has strong influences on GDP growth (Dell, Jones, and Olken 
2012; Boldin and Wright 2015; Burke, Hsiang, and Miguel 2015) and con-
flict (Hsiang, Meng, and Cane 2011; Hsiang, Burke, and Miguel 2013). 
If detrimental weather shocks cause both agricultural and other sectors to 
decline while commodity prices spike, there might be an induced correla-
tion that is not causal. The authors address this by only using agricultural 
shocks outside the United States, but the spurious correlation might even 
be at work if countries’ GDPs are linked through international trade. On top 
of this, the VAR structure might be too restrictive to force the identification 
to rest on unexpected shocks. This empirical puzzle—that the VAR detects 
a relationship that the reduced-form analysis fails to pick up—needs to be 
addressed by future research.
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COMMENT BY
MARK W. WATSON  This paper by Jasmien De Winne and Gert 
Peersman is an ambitious and careful analysis of the effects of global 
food supply shocks on the U.S. macroeconomy. The authors use a familiar 
framework—structural vector autoregression (SVAR)—and related distrib-
uted lag models. Their key challenge is to identify exogenous variation in 
global food production that can be used to estimate the dynamic causal 
effects of global food shocks on the U.S. macroeconomy. They do this 
in two complementary ways, both involving the construction of new data 
series.
For their first approach, they construct a quarterly index of crop harvests 
for four staple food commodities using data covering nearly 200 coun-
tries. They argue that much of the unforecastable variation in harvests is 
exogenous because planting decisions are made in the quarters before the 
harvest. Using this logic, 1-quarter-ahead forecast errors in their produc-
tion index are exogenous food supply shocks. The dynamic causal effects 
of food shocks can be identified by ordering their global food production 
index as the first variable in an SVAR identified by a Wold causal ordering.
For their second approach, they construct a time series of narrative 
shocks that isolate quarters in which major changes in food production 
were caused by judgmentally determined exogenous factors. The authors 
find 13 such quarters during their 1963–2013 sample period. They use 
the resulting set of indicator variables as instruments to estimate dynamic 
causal effects in a series of distributed lag models.
Both approaches yield similar conclusions; an unexpected increase in 
global food supply leads to (i) a reduction in global food prices, (ii) an 
increase in U.S. GDP, (iii) a decrease in both overall and core prices, (iv) a 
decrease in interest rates, and (v) a relatively large increase in expenditures 
on durable consumption goods. The authors argue that part of the channel 
from food production shocks to expenditures on consumer durables runs 
through interest rates—that is, Federal Reserve easing as inflation falls fol-
lowing a favorable food supply shock.1 But their estimates suggest that this 
interest rate channel is responsible for only one-third of the total effect. The 
channel (or channels) explaining the remaining two-thirds remains a mys-
tery, although the authors provide several interesting conjectures.
Here, I use an alternative econometric framework—a structural dynamic 
factor model (SDFM)—to estimate the causal effect of global food shocks 
1. See Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson (1997) for a related analysis of the monetary policy 
channel for oil shocks.
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on the U.S. macroeconomy. I have two goals: first, to gauge the robustness 
of the authors’ conclusions; and second, to see if the alternative framework 
provides additional clues as to why global food supply shocks have such a 
large effect of expenditures for consumer durables. To preview the results, 
I find the authors’ main empirical conclusions are robust to this alternative 
framework, but the SDFM suggests that the interest rate channel may be 
more important than is suggested by the authors’ SVAR.
I begin by briefly reviewing the SDFM and how it (usefully, in my mind) 
extends the authors’ SVAR analysis.2 A key feature of the SDFM is that it 
easily scales up to incorporate more variables. In a standard n-variable 
SVAR, the number of parameters to be estimated is of the order n2; in an 
SDFM, the number of parameters is of the order n. This makes it possible 
to include many more variables in an SDFM than would be feasible in an 
SVAR. For example, I use more than 200 macroeconomic variables in the 
SDFM to estimate the effect of global food supply shocks. The large num-
ber of variables in the SDFM gives it two distinct advantages over an 
SVAR: First, it attenuates omitted variable and measurement error biases 
in estimates of the unobserved structural shocks; and second, it provides a 
coherent framework for estimating the effect of shocks on a large number 
of macroeconomic variables. The general SDFM has the form
= Λ +X F et t t(1) ,
F F Gt t t(2) L ,1( )= Φ + η−
where Xt is an n × 1 vector of observed variables (n > 200 in this applica-
tion), Ft is a k × 1 vector of unobserved factors where k is relatively small 
(k = 8 here), et is a vector of idiosyncratic errors, and ht is a vector of the 
model’s structural shocks. My interest is in global food shocks, so they are 
an element of ht.
When interest focuses on a structural shock that has only a small effect 
on most of the variables in the model, its factor needs to be tightly con-
nected to an observed series (Stock and Watson 2016). As De Winne and 
Peersman show, this is the case for food supply shocks, as they explain 
2. Stock and Watson (2016) provide a comprehensive survey of dynamic factor models 
and how the structural versions of these models, SDFMs, are related to SVARs. The empiri-
cal results presented here use this framework, and are closely related to the analysis of oil 
supply shocks appearing in Stock and Watson’s (2016) survey.
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only a small amount of the variability in U.S. macroeconomic variables. 
This leads me to specify equation 1 of the SDFM as
X
Q
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Food
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Food
t F F F
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P Food
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Other
t
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Q Food P Food Other
(3)
1 0 0
0 1 0
0
0 ,=






=
λ λ λ












+






−
−
− −
where QtFood is the logarithm of the global food supply index constructed by 
De Winne and Peersman, PtFood is the logarithm of the food commodity 
price index constructed by De Winne and Peersman, and Yt is a vector 
of more than 200 macroeconomic variables, as described by Stock and 
Watson (2016). From equation 3, the first factor, FtQ-Food, is the global food 
index and the second factor, FtP-Food, is the food commodity price index. 
The other factors, FtOther, are not directly observed, and they correspond 
to macroeconomic factors beyond food supply and food prices that cause 
common variation in the macroeconomic variables included in Yt. Finally, 
using the same timing assumption as the authors’ SVAR, I set the first row 
of G in equation 2 as (1 0 . . . 0), so that the first element of ht is the global 
food supply shock. I estimate the model using six factors in FtOther and four 
lags of F in the VAR in equation 2.
My table 1 shows the estimated impulse effects, ∂Xi,t+h/∂h tQ-Food, com-
puted using the SDFM model along with the fraction of forecast error vari-
ance associated with the food supply shock, hQ-Food. The first row shows that 
the food shock has a unit impact effect on the logarithm of global food pro-
duction and an R2 of 1, which follow from the identifying assumptions that 
the shock yields a 1 log point increase in food production, and this shock 
explains all of the 1-quarter-ahead forecast error. The next row shows the 
estimated effect of this shock on the logarithm of the food commodity price 
index after h = 1 quarter. Food prices fall by 0.39 log points, and food 
supply shocks explain just 7 percent of the variance in food prices at this 
horizon. The SDFM includes more than 200 variables, and the remaining 
rows of the table show impulse responses for a subset of these variables 
after h = 5 quarters.
The SDFM’s estimates suggest many of the same conclusions as the 
SVAR used by the authors. An exogenous 1 log point increase in global 
food supply leads to (i) a nearly identical fall in global food prices (0.39 
in the SDFM versus 0.41 in the SVAR); (ii) an increase in U.S. GDP; 
(iii) decreases in both overall and core prices, both measured by personal 
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Table 1. Estimated Effect of Global Food Supply Shocks on Selected Variables  
from a Structural Dynamic Factor Modela
Variable Impulse response at horizon h R2(h)
Global food production (h = 0) 1.000 (0.000) 1.00
Food commodity price index (h = 1) -0.390 (0.110) 0.07
Other variables (h = 5)
GDP 0.037 (0.021) 0.01
Consumption 0.050 (0.020) 0.04
Consumption: durables 0.153 (0.070) 0.03
Consumption: nondurables 0.044 (0.019) 0.03
Consumption: services 0.027 (0.010) 0.03
Investment 0.046 (0.082) 0.00
Investment: fixed nonresidential -0.002 (0.062) 0.01
Investment: fixed residential 0.340 (0.120) 0.04
Industrial production 0.023 (0.040) 0.01
Industrial production: consumer durables 0.128 (0.075) 0.01
Industrial production: automobiles 0.190 (0.107) 0.01
Employment 0.009 (0.016) 0.00
Unemployment rate -0.810 (0.951) 0.01
Labor productivity 0.034 (0.017) 0.02
Housing permits 0.656 (0.226) 0.04
Retail sales 0.097 (0.039) 0.04
PCE prices -0.063 (0.028) 0.04
PCE prices: core -0.029 (0.014) 0.02
PCE prices: food and beverages -0.137 (0.058) 0.05
PCE prices: durable goods -0.038 (0.027) 0.01
PCE prices: services -0.028 (0.015) 0.03
Federal funds rate -4.310 (2.140) 0.04
10-year Treasury bond rate -2.440 (0.880) 0.03
30-year mortgage rate -3.000 (1.130) 0.04
Senior Loan Officer Opinion Surveyb 3.730 (1.300) 0.06
Excess bond premiumc -0.660 (0.305) 0.01
S&P 500 Index 0.293 (0.183) 0.01
Housing prices 0.068 (0.034) 0.02
Exchange rates -0.114 (0.059) 0.02
Consumer expectations 2.460 (0.850) 0.04
Oil production 0.062 (0.026) 0.01
Oil prices -0.483 (0.260) 0.03
CPI gasoline -0.259 (0.141) 0.03
Sources: Author’s calculations; Stock and Watson (2016).
a. R2(h) is the fraction of the (h + 1)-quarter-ahead forecast error associated with the global supply 
shock. Standard errors (computed using parametric bootstrap simulations) are in parentheses.
b. The Federal Reserve Board’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank Lending Practices is a 
quarterly survey of large banks that seeks qualitative information with respect to changes in bank lending 
practices in the previous quarter.
c. The excess bond premium measure comes from Gilchrist and Zakrajšek (2012).
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consumption expenditures (PCE) in the SDFM; (iv) a decrease in inter-
est rates; and (v) a relatively large increase in expenditures on consumer 
durables.
That said, there are interesting quantitative differences in the estimated 
effects of the SDFM and SVAR that, when coupled with the information 
from other variables, suggest a more important role for interest rates in the 
transmission of food shocks to the macroeconomy. For example, in addi-
tion to large effects on consumer durable expenditures and automobile pro-
duction, food shocks have large effects on residential investment and new 
housing permits. Evidently, sectors that are sensitive to the interest rate 
are particularly affected by food shocks. The SDFM suggests a somewhat 
smaller effect of the shocks on GDP (roughly 60 percent of the size of the 
SVAR effect), and a larger and more persistent effect on the federal funds 
rates (consistent with the results for the authors’ FAVAR model in their 
figure 11). Longer-term interest rates (10-year Treasury bonds and 30-year 
mortgage rates) fall significantly following a favorable food supply shock. 
Other financial variables also move in ways consistent with an easing of 
monetary policy: Stock prices rise, the dollar falls relative to other curren-
cies, the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey indicates 
an easing of credit, and the excess bond premium described by Simon 
Gilchrist and Egon Zakrajšek (2012) falls.
The SDFM results suggest that interest rates are an important, perhaps 
dominant, channel for the effect of food shocks on the macroeconomy. The 
size of the effect of food shocks on sectors that are sensitive to the interest 
rate (residential investment, expenditures on consumer durables) appears to 
be roughly what would be predicted by the effect of these shocks on inter-
est rates (Bernanke and Gertler 1995; McCarthy and Peach 2002).
Of course, this SDFM exercise is merely a single robustness check that 
should be viewed in the context of the large number of careful exercises 
reported by De Winne and Peersman. Their paper raises a novel and interest-
ing question, and I have no doubt that it will be investigated in future papers 
using other methods and data. I look forward to following this research.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION  Lutz Kilian observed that the paper’s pri-
mary story that food supply shocks raise the price of food and lower the 
discretionary income of consumers, given that households spend a rela-
tively large proportion of their budget on food, is a sensible starting point 
for the analysis, but that this view is not supported by the evidence. The 
first problem is how to define “food prices.” On one hand, there are food 
commodity prices in the global economy; on the other hand, there are U.S. 
retail food prices. In a recent paper, Kilian and Christiane Baumeister show 
that, despite large fluctuations in global food commodity prices, there was 
virtually no change in U.S. retail food prices.1 One explanation is that 
most of the prices of final goods are determined by factors other than com-
modity prices; for example, data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
suggest that only about 5 percent of the cost of producing bread comes 
from the cost of wheat. According to this logic, it is easy to see why a 
fluctuation in the global price of wheat would have very little effect on the 
retail price of bread. Hence, if there is a channel of transmission from food 
commodity prices to the macroeconomy, as the authors conjectured, that 
channel must be about something entirely different, something that links 
food commodity prices to real GDP.
The interesting part of the paper, Kilian contended, is not the impulse 
responses and variance compositions; it is the historical decompositions 
that quantify the cumulative effect of food supply shocks. Kilian stressed 
that these historical decompositions reveal a puzzle. This puzzle is how 
food supply shocks that explain little of the evolution of global food com-
modity prices can explain much of the variation in U.S. real GDP growth 
and its components at the same time. A good example is the apparently 
large effect of food supply shocks on automobile purchases by consumers. 
One potential explanation for this finding might seem to be the discretion-
1. Christiane Baumeister and Lutz Kilian, “Do Oil Price Increases Cause Higher Food 
Prices?” Economic Policy 29, no. 80 (2014): 691–747.
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ary incomes as food prices change; but as Kilian had just observed, there 
is little variation in discretionary incomes because retail food prices do not 
move much. A second possible explanation is that there might be a direct 
link between crude oil prices, biofuel prices, and food commodity prices; 
but as Kilian had mentioned, he and Baumeister had found no support for 
such a link. Yet another possible explanation is that monetary policymakers 
might have responded to changes in inflation driven by changes in retail 
food prices, Kilian explained; but there have been no large changes in retail 
food price inflation, so this explanation does not seem plausible. Finally, 
Kilian expressed skepticism about the paper’s attempt to explain its find-
ings based on other channels of the transmission of food supply shocks 
(such as reallocation effects or food price uncertainty effects). The latter 
channels, Kilian pointed out, all require the use of nonlinear models, and 
hence cannot be used to rationalize the authors’ estimates obtained from 
linear models.
Kilian concluded that, rather than there being some mystery explanation 
yet to be discovered, the paper likely has a problem identifying food sup-
ply shocks. A properly identified model, he contended, would include data 
on global food prices and quantities, but would also include changes in 
income that ultimately drive the demand for food. It would also include 
things like inventories of food commodities, which are difficult to mea-
sure. Kilian argued that the paper’s model might also have omitted vari-
ables as well as measurement problems, pointing to a mismatch between 
the prices and quantity data for food commodities. For example, the 
Soviet Union is included in constructing the quality measure, but the 
Soviet Union only very intermittently participated in global food com-
modity markets, meaning that the price data do not match the quantity 
data, invalidating the identification.
Kilian had one final comment related to the paper’s results on the effects 
of the oil supply shocks. He noted that the way the paper identified these 
shocks was not state of the art; rather, it was done in a way that, according 
to recent research, is known to be misleading because it does not impose 
all relevant identifying restrictions.2 He suggested discarding that particular 
2. See, for example, Lutz Kilian and Daniel P. Murphy, “Why Agnostic Sign Restrictions 
Are Not Enough: Understanding the Dynamics of Oil Market VAR Models,” Journal of the 
European Economic Association 10, no. 5 (2012): 1166–88; Christiane Baumeister and Gert 
Peersman, “The Role of Time-Varying Price Elasticities in Accounting for Volatility Changes 
in the Crude Oil Market,” Journal of Applied Econometrics 28, no. 7 (2013): 1087–1109; 
and Juan Antolin-Diaz and Juan Francisco Rubio Ramírez, “Narrative Sign Restrictions for 
SVARs,” Discussion Paper no. 11517, London: Centre for Economic Policy Research.
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evidence; but more important, he failed to see why that evidence was 
included in the paper in the first place, given that it is not related to the 
paper’s central question of what the effects of food supply shocks are.
As Mark Watson’s discussion had emphasized, Christopher Sims noted 
that it is hard to reliably estimate the effects of food prices because the 
contribution to the shocks’ variance is small. Sims took issue with Watson’s 
approach in his presentation of taking the first difference of the data, not-
ing that the cointegration literature finds that this is a bad idea because 
it throws away too much information. It is always possible to get differ-
ent results with a worse model, he noted. If the authors could show that 
altering their model to produce a better fit would give different results, 
this would be a legitimate criticism; but Watson’s presentation simply pre-
sented a handful of other models, some of which may fit much worse. Sims 
hoped that the authors would do more to analyze their model’s fit.
Sims was surprised that the authors were able to show big impulse 
responses with good estimates of the error bands. It is hard to know what 
kind of model would explain the error bands, he noted; but the effects 
are certainly there, and are statistically significant. To undermine this, 
one would need to produce a better model showing that the error bands 
are wrong or that the impulse responses come out in a different way.
Sims mentioned a few possible econometric issues. Specifically, when 
it comes to food prices, seasonality is extremely important. Seasonality 
is pervasive in price and output data for commodities, particularly food 
commodities. The authors’ model, as he understands it, includes seasonal 
dummies and uses seasonally adjusted data. He noted a bit of danger in 
doing this, because seasonally adjusted data always use future data as part 
of the adjustment. Unraveling this adjustment using a multivariable vector 
autoregression could be cause for worry, and so Sims suggested that the 
authors check for robustness there, by testing whether the seasonal dum-
mies matter or by replacing some series with series that are not seasonally 
adjusted and by leaving in the dummies. He noted that commodity prices 
notoriously produce nonnormal residuals due to large outliers. According 
to the authors’ current framework, it would not be too difficult to construct 
a model that allowed for t-distributed errors, which would indicate whether 
the results were being driven by a few large outliers.
Justin Wolfers noted that what the authors do with the global food index 
seems to make sense; once a crop is planted, conditional on what is planted, 
what ends up getting harvested seems exogenous. In the regression context, 
if one were to include harvests and control for planting, then other exog-
enous effects would be identified. But the authors did not seem to include 
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planting in their model, so he was not sure how harvests turned out to be 
exogenous.
Looking at the authors’ results at face value, Robert Hall thought they 
seemed totally implausible, which is always interesting, he noted. A big 
wave in macroeconomic theory, pioneered by Robert Shiller, deals with 
a concept variously termed confidence, sentiment, ambiguity aversion, or 
animal spirits. Models that have these features tend to generate the pattern 
observed by the authors, which is changes in a wide variety of macro-
economic variables that are similar in magnitude and are highly correlated. 
Within this framework, the price of basic cereals should be profoundly and 
primordially important for the present paper. It seems sensible, he noted, 
that they could perhaps trigger changes in confidence; if so, this is interest-
ing because most research in this area has taken it to be totally unobserv-
able and not triggered by some natural phenomenon. He suggested that the 
present paper could constitute a new branch of this line of thinking.
Martin Eichenbaum bet that a typical consumer has no clue about what 
is happening in commodity markets, and that the real question consumers 
face is about the price they are actually paying at the grocery store, not the 
price of cereals on the commodity market. Hall contended that, in fact, peo-
ple are well informed through the media about commodity prices, which 
Eichenbaum stated was possible.
Eichenbaum also commented on variance being small and yet things 
being estimated precisely. There is an analogue in the literature on mon-
etary policy shocks: When models are estimated in log levels, they explain 
very little of the variance in output identified with fund shocks, and yet 
standard errors are generally estimated quite precisely. He suggested that 
this might be something for the authors to consider.
Building on Hall’s comments, James Stock added that there is a lot 
of evidence that consumer sentiment tends to move with prices that are 
highly salient, such as those for gasoline and meat. An empirical question 
is whether this salience—even though it turns out not to be a big deal in 
bottom-line expenditures—might be a feature.
Narayana Kocherlakota suggested that since commodities have a durable 
aspect, movements in discount factors could actually have an effect on their 
prices. He proposed that perhaps the authors’ food prices were picking up 
a spurious correlation, and that discount factors are moving in relation to 
many other important things in the economy. He suggested that adding 
stock prices to their model might avoid some of this spurious correlation.
Gerald Cohen noted that there is a nontrivial lag between the effect of 
input costs for types of feed—like corn and wheat—and the cost of meat. 
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He recalled a glut of meat production in the middle to late 2000s, following 
the increase in corn prices, and suggested that the authors might look into 
this phenomenon. A related phenomenon is observed in the pig industry, 
called the corn–hog cycle. This cycle consists of massive fluctuations in 
pig production caused by overreactions to changes in the market prices 
of pigs and their feed. In pig rearing, feedstuffs are a large proportion of 
the economic market cost of a pig, so a change in feedstuff price has an 
immediate effect on farmers’ profits; conversely, cattle primarily eat grass, 
and specialty feed is normally only a small proportion of total feed costs.
Echoing Sims, Peersman was critical of Watson’s stability argument 
because estimating the model in first differences does not take into account 
potential cointegration relationships between the data. This approach was 
also the only one of which he was aware that produced somewhat weaker 
effects and different dynamics. He noted that estimating several variants of 
the level specifications for the full sample produces results that are quanti-
tatively and qualitatively very similar.
Regarding variance decompositions, though it is true that the shocks 
explain only about 10 percent of U.S. GDP variation, Peersman asked, 
“Did you expect more?” Food prices are obviously not the main driver 
of the U.S. business cycle, so it is good that the authors did not find big 
effects, he contended. Notwithstanding, the contribution of food commod-
ity market shocks to GDP variation turns out to be approximately the same 
as monetary policy or oil supply shocks, which are two shocks that receive 
a lot of attention in the literature. Peersman agreed with Eichenbaum that 
the macroeconomic consequences could be estimated quite precisely, even 
when they explain a relatively small proportion of the variance.
In response to questions of omitted variable bias, he noted that the 
authors’ VAR model does not include global income measures, and that 
they had tested their model for robustness by including both more and 
fewer variables. The authors believed that the final model, which includes 
10 variables, was sufficient to counter omitted variable bias. This is also 
confirmed by the FAVAR analysis reported in the paper. Furthermore, 
the narrative analysis revealed that food commodity market events in the 
Soviet Union did have an important influence on global commodity prices, 
even in the 1970s. However, as Kilian had suggested, Peersman noted that 
data on inventories do not exist at the required quarterly frequency.
Looking at subsamples, Peersman noted that, taking into account 
the error bands, the results are stable if two decades of observations are 
excluded at the beginning or the end of the sample period. The results 
become less stable for shorter sample periods but this should not be a sur-
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prise, because the authors are working with 10 variables and thus many 
observations are needed to make proper estimates. For more parsimonious 
versions of the VAR—for example, by including fewer variables or lags—
the results are also stable for shorter sample periods. In general, much vari-
ation in the variables is needed to capture the shocks of global food prices 
and food production, which is why Peersman is not a fan of these types of 
subsample analysis.
Schlenker was surprised to find that people spend about the same 
amount on food each year. He stated that a natural question to ask, then, is 
why there are any effects of food shocks at all. Peersman asserted that this 
is exactly the point, and might be the mechanism: When people keep on 
consuming equally as much food because they need to eat every day, they 
must cut expenditures on some other components of their budgets. The data 
suggest that households in the lowest quintile of the income distribution 
spend about 36 percent of their income on food; furthermore, low-income 
households are typically liquidity constrained, so food price fluctuations 
might have big effects on these households’ other types of spending. There 
also seems to be a significant decline in consumer confidence, which is a 
natural amplifier of the macroeconomic consequences.
Peersman disagreed with Kilian’s assertion that there is no pass-through 
from global food prices to domestic retail prices. Peersman argued that 
there is, in fact, a one-to-one pass-through of global food commodity 
prices to U.S. food commodity prices, and a pass-through to the food com-
ponent of the consumer price index proportional to the share of food com-
modities in final food products. He also stressed that this share has been 
about 14 percent on average, which is much larger than the share Kilian 
was insinuating. Regarding the authors’ identification strategy for oil sup-
ply shocks, Peersman noted that this strategy followed that used in a recent 
paper he and Baumeister published in the American Economic Journal.3 
Furthermore, he asserted that imposing the kind of restrictions on the elas-
ticities that Kilian had suggested produces the same results, noting that 
these restrictions only matter to identify demand shocks in the oil market, 
not supply shocks.
Peersman conceded that Sims’s point about seasonality was a good one. 
There is indeed much seasonality in the food production index. He noted 
that they had run specifications without seasonal dummies, and this had no 
3. Christiane Baumeister and Gert Peersman, “Time-Varying Effects of Oil Supply 
Shocks on the U.S. Economy,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 5, no. 4 
(2013): 1–28.
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influence on the results. The authors also found similar macroeconomic 
consequences using data that were not seasonally adjusted, as Sims had 
also suggested. All in all, the authors found that the effects are similar 
across the various specifications.
Regarding Wolfers’s comment about why the authors do not include 
data on crop planting, Peersman noted that planting data are actually not 
needed because what is being identified are quarterly shocks, that is, shocks 
within the harvesting quarter. Everything that happens before this quarter 
should already be included in the information of the model’s other vari-
ables. Food commodity prices, for instance, should contain all the relevant 
information about planting that is in principle reflected in the price just 
before the harvesting quarter.
Regarding Kocherlakota’s suggestions that there could be a common 
shock to commodities that is basically driven by rates of returns and dis-
count factors, Peersman noted that this was indeed one of the authors’ 
concerns, and they did a lot of work to figure out whether this was the case. 
For example, in the paper they show that only food commodity market 
variables react on impact. Similarly, GDP and other variables only start 
to decline after a couple of quarters, meaning that on impact, there is no 
shock directly affecting GDP. More importantly, equity prices also do not 
shift on impact.
Finally, Peersman noted that estimating the impact of food prices on 
exports shows that the effects are not strong. Even though there is a decline 
in global economic activity, exports do not appear to be the culprit; they 
decline a bit, but the effect is not statistically significant. He concluded that 
domestic consumption is what really seems to drive the output effect.
